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 The general public often views the practice of politics to be incompatible with 
truth telling. Despite this perspective, I argue these two concepts coexisted in the 1912 
campaign of Eugene V. Debs. Using Michel Foucault‟s unfinished work on parrhesia, or 
frank speaking, I argue that Debs functioned as a parrhesiast. To make this argument, I 
analyze Debs‟s discourse against what Foucault‟s work suggests are the three essential 
elements of parrhesia: compulsion, risk, and authenticity. Because Debs‟s parrhesiastic 
sensibilities become more obvious when compared with his opponents in the 1912 
election, I analyze Debs‟s discourse in relation to William Howard Taft, Woodrow 
Wilson, and Theodore Roosevelt. Although a small minority in rhetorical studies have 
explored Debs‟s ethos as a rhetorical strength, none have situated Debs in relation to 
parrhesia, but to do so is appropriate and beneficial. Because of Debs‟s success in 
garnering six percent of the popular vote as a third-party candidate in 1912, his evocation 
of parrhesia in politics reveals advantages and possibilities for reconciling the practices of 
truth telling and politics.  
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The acts of truth telling and politics often appear to be irreconcilable; yet, both 
seem to coexist in the 1912 campaign speeches of Socialist leader Eugene V. Debs. This 
truth telling act, which Michel Foucault identifies as parrhesia, manifested throughout 
Debs‟s rhetoric as he vied to be President of the United States. This thesis explores the 
concept of parrhesia in relation to Eugene Debs and the rhetorical situation of the 1912 
presidential election.  
In the context of the 1912 election, I will argue that Debs functions as a 
parrhesiast in contrast to his fellow candidates: Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, 
and William Howard Taft. Importantly, in confronting his fellow candidates, Debs makes 
the central critique of his opponents not their political or economic ideology, as would be 
expected in any political debate, but their insincerity to the American voters. Thus, the 
issue for Debs as parrhesiast is that Americans deserve honest campaign presentations 
from their politicians. Characterizing Debs as parrhesiast allows me to closely explore the 
elements of parrhesia and compare these qualities with the practices of campaign politics. 
This thesis shows the fundamental distinction between politics and parrhesia is the 
opposition between the ethos of the politician and the parrhesiast. As opposed to the 
former, the latter is characterized as one compelled to perform an ethical act of speaking 
out for the benefit of a community. One of the central questions of this thesis is the 
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possibilities for parrhesia in politics, and a study of Eugene Debs illustrates these 
potentialities. 
What exactly is parrhesia? Although defining this concept should be an easy task 
and seemingly an essential component of any such study, any particular definition of 
parrhesia must be contextualized. Whether spelled parrhesia, parrēsia or parrhēsia, this 
concept of truth telling has not had a singular meaning or a linear trajectory. Through its 
early establishment in the plays of Euripides to its somewhat formalization in 
Philodemus‟s On Frank Criticism to Michel Foucault‟s final lectures on parrhesia as an 
ethical framework, it has been modified for various purposes to fit any given rhetorical 
moment or philosophical investigation. Despite these changes, parrhesia, as Foucault 
notes, fundamentally deals with the “old, traditional question, which is at the very heart 
of Western philosophy, of the relations between the subject and truth, […]” (Courage of 
Truth 3). In Courage of Truth, Michel Foucault further states, “But we should 
immediately add the clarification that this word parrhēsia may be employed with two 
values” (9). Foucault traces both a positive and negative aspect of parrhesia (Lévy 313). 
The “negative” aspect stems from Philodemus‟s usage of parrhesia as a technique of 
rhetoric.  
Although Frank Criticism argues for the importance of parrhesia as a means of 
displaying “personal candor” and as the essence of “moral education,” Philodemus 
writes, “In short, a wise man will employ frankness toward his friends […]” (fr. 15), 
which suggests parrhesia in this sense is a neutral, tactical device to be deployed in a 
rhetorical situation. However, parrhesia, to Foucault, is “a passion, since it entails an 
emotional investment, and a virtue, insofar as it is still linked to courage” (Lévy 314). To 
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Foucault, parrhesia is “a modality of truth-telling, […]” (Courage of Truth 14). Indeed, 
the rhetor must understand the risks of speaking, including “the risk of not being heard by 
the other party or parities or of being silenced entirely, […]” (Walzer 4-5). Thus, 
parrhesia “involves some form of courage, the minimal form of which consists in the 
parreshiast taking the risk of breaking and ending the relationship to the other person 
which was precisely what made his discourse possible” (Foucault, Courage of Truth 11). 
Despite its tie to the subject, Philodemus‟s On Frank Criticism argues, “It is indeed 
possible to [dist]inguish [the nature] of one who practices frankness from a polite 
disposition and that of one who {does so} from a base one” (Col. Ib). Thus, it is 
appropriate and, as Philodemus suggests, possible to identify Debs‟s sense of parrhesia 
and its usage during the 1912 election against his fellow interlocutors. 
Recent translations of Foucault‟s final lectures have caused some rhetorical 
scholars to turn their attention to parrhesia. One such study is that of Carlos Lévy, who 
focuses on Foucault‟s two principle senses of parrhesia, as outlined in Courage of Truth. 
Lévy seems to be interested in the way in which parrhesia is separated from rhetoric in 
Foucault, who divides parrhesia in terms of passion, associated with rhetoric, and virtue, 
which is associated with philosophy (314). Lévy wants illustrate the presence of passion 
in “good” parrhesia and, thus, link parrhesia with rhetoric (315). He reinterprets 
Foucault‟s readings of Pericles, Socrates, and Philo to present an alternate, more 
ambiguous parrhesia than is found Foucault‟s articulation in his lectures. Noting 
parrhesia‟s absence in histories of antiquity, Lévy suggests, parrhesia might have been 
considered “a useless concept for a historian wanting to explain events, speeches, and 
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actions with accuracy” (324). However, I argue parrhesia does provide a new lens 
through which to understand historical acts. 
 One notable study is Arthur Walzer‟s “Parrēsia, Foucault, and the Classical 
Rhetorical Tradition.” Walzer‟s work seeks to further complicate Foucault‟s 
conceptualization of parrhesia by essentially questioning our ability to ever detect sincere 
parrhesia (Walzer 3). He does so when he writes, “[F]rom a rhetorical point of view what 
in Foucault is seen as sincere parrēsia might be feigned and what he reads as rhetorically 
artless is often highly rhetorical” (Walzer 18). His argument seeks to oppose Foucault‟s 
conception of parrhesia as diametrically opposed to rhetoric and “right the imbalance” 
(Walzer 18). Despite his approach to form a counter-history of parrhesia, Walzer‟s 
contribution might be to have begun a conversation on the hazards of dealing with 
parrhesia as a stable concept.  
This became apparent in the pages of a Rhetoric Society Quarterly forum. In this 
forum, Pat Gehrke, Susan Jarratt, and Bradford Vivian each productively respond to 
some of the implications and assumptions made by Walzer‟s argument. Each illustrates 
the elusive nature of parrhesia that makes a rhetorical study of the concept fraught with 
challenges. Jarratt‟s concern seems to be with the orientation of any corrective project, 
which risks unnecessary divisions, such as between “„old history‟ and „new theory,‟ or in 
older terms, rhetoric from philosophy” (363). Vivian‟s response argues that neither the 
counter-history of Walzer or the subject/truth history of Foucault can be reconciled 
because of the reductions both take in their definitions of either rhetoric or parrhesia 
(372). Similarly, for Gehrke, the problem for any project lies in the irreducibility of the 
concept when considered over the entire span of antiquity. Gehrke writes, “[N]either 
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parrēsia nor rhetoric is reducible to a single form or tradition over the ancient period. 
Certainly Foucault did not hold this to be the case and neither should we” (361). Walzer, 
Jarratt, Vivian, and Gehrke also provide salient points to consider for any study of 
parrhesia.  
Although for the sake of analysis this study uses Foucault‟s definition of parrhesia 
as a useful analytic, it is also an attempt to locate the boundaries of parrhesia in relation 
to political rhetoric. This thesis is not an attempt to reach back to antiquity to correct or 
clarify; it is an attempt to bring forward antiquity‟s concept of parrhesia to see its 
instantiation in more recent history, the election of 1912, to see its possibilities for 
histories yet written.  
One would search in vain through the archives of the 1912 presidential election to 
find a specific articulation of the word “parrhesia,” but one can, however, find the 
evocation of the concept of parrhesia. For my usage of parrhesia as a means to analyze 
the rhetoric of Debs, following Foucault‟s direction, I will draw on several essential 
characteristics of parrhesia as a means to illustrate Debs‟s ethical style. In order for there 
to be parrhesia, I argue, these three essential elements must be present: the rhetor must 
display motivations of offering frank criticism as compulsive, the rhetor must risk 
something by speaking frankly, and the rhetor must demonstrate an ethos of authentically 
speaking to benefit the citizenry.  
In general, the 1912 campaign represents an interesting moment in the history of 
American politics and an appropriate moment for an analysis of parrhesia because of the 
abnormality of the campaign itself, which featured four major contenders seeking the 
presidency. Two of these contenders, of course, were operating outside of the two-party 
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political establishment. Although neither Roosevelt nor Debs captured enough votes to 
secure the country‟s highest office, each garnered a significant response from the 
population. Surprisingly, when the votes were counted, six percent of voters cast their 
ballot for Debs (Broderick 207). This was clearly not a majority of Americans aligned 
with Debs but was significantly more than the 100,000 Americans registered in the 
Socialist Party (Flehinger 17).  Perhaps the key to understanding this unique moment for 
Socialist dissent in America is through exploring the ethos of its leader. Of the various 
components of Debs‟s ethos as rhetor, his chief virtue lies in his effective utilization of 
parrhesia or frank speaking. Although Debs‟s campaign did not secure him the 
presidency, the movement itself can be viewed as a success, particularly considering the 
skepticism surrounding Socialism within the United States. One of the research questions 
of this study is why such a subset of the population supported third-party candidates, 
especially a Socialist leader. One plausible answer and one of the assumptions of this 
study is that Debs‟s successful evocation of himself as parrhesiast rather than politician 
contributed to his appeal to voters. If we can explore the ways in which Debs made his 
ideology more palatable to American voters, perhaps others may employ these 
mechanisms to work toward an ideology of inclusion rather than the exclusionary 
practice that defines the current political environment. 
In rhetorical studies, an analysis of the impact of Debs‟s presentation of parrhesia 
is useful to those exploring movements and ways of dissension in the American political 
landscape.  Although scholars have remarked on Debs‟s ethos, none have connected this 
ethical appeal to parrhesia, though to do so seems extremely appropriate. By looking at 
the elements that contribute to his ethos, crucially among these is parrhesia, one can 
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perhaps gain a fuller understanding of what gives Debs‟s ethical appeal such legitimacy. 
Thus, I hope to connect Debs‟s success in 1912 with his presentation of himself as one 
who is compelled to speak the truth. Such a study builds on the work of a few rhetorical 
scholars who have focused on Debs. 
Although he has not explored Debs in relation to parrhesia, James Darsey is by far 
the rhetorical scholar most interested in Debs‟s ethos. His “The Legend of Eugene Debs: 
Prophetic Ethos as Radical Argument” argues Debs rhetorically constructed himself in 
the image of the prophet, martyr, and vir bonus to strengthen his ethos. Darsey examines 
Debs‟s speeches and the elements that align with the characteristics of the prophet and 
martyr: charisma, conversion, sacrifice, and compulsion. He also analyses the prophetic 
nature of Debs‟s discourse, which ultimately did secure his position as prophet and 
martyr in public memory. Darsey‟s article is the first to explore Debs in relation to public 
memory, particularly the way in which Deb‟s ideology is increasingly moderated into the 
American ideal of classical liberalism.  
Further attempting to locate Debs within rhetorical scholarship, Darsey finds the 
opportunity in his brief contribution to demagoguery studies. In “Patricia Roberts-Miller, 
Demagoguery, and the Troublesome Case of Eugene Debs,” Darsey responds to Roberts-
Miller‟s formalization of the qualities of demagoguery. From their backgrounds to their 
use of in-group/out-group rhetoric, simplification, and Burkean identification, Darsey 
concludes that Debs is strikingly similar to Joseph McCarthy, Roberts-Miller‟s ideal 
demagogue. However, Darsey finds that Debs cannot even be placed in the same 
category of demagogue because of significant ethical differences, where Debs represents 
“an essentially generous and humane ethos, […]” (“Patricia Robert-Miller” 465). 
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Although he does mention parrhesia, Darsey finds Debs‟s compulsion to speak the truth 
as one of his distinguishing qualities. Darsey illustrates, once again, it is Debs‟s ethic that 
seems to shield him from the criticism directed at most politicians. I explore Darsey‟s 
conception of Debs further in chapter two in relation to William Howard Taft.  
Taking their direction from Darsey‟s work, in “A Story of Rhetorical-Ideological 
Transformation: Eugene V. Debs as Liberal Hero,” Ronald Lee and James Andrews 
argue that the transformation of Debs from an American deviant to hero depends on the 
moderation of his ideology in public memory. The authors examine historical biographies 
of Debs‟s life and compare them to contemporary conceptions. Lee and Andrews argue 
that the historical construction of Debs as an exemplary American depends on the 
importance of Debs‟s perceived virtue and the progressive view of history, which 
amplifies this virtue and extends it to his ideology. For example, they write, “Thus, the 
ethical appeal in Debs‟ discourse is changed by the passage of time and the changed 
apprehension of the meaning of the labor movement in American history” (Lee and 
Andrews 35). In chapter three, I connect Lee and Andrews‟s commentary on Debs and 
public memory in relation to Woodrow Wilson as a suggestion on how parrhesia might 
prove effective in the long term. 
Another rhetorical scholar exploring Debs as an idealization is Robert Ivie. Ivie‟s 
“Toward a Humanizing Style of Democratic Dissent,” which does not solely focus on 
Debs, argues the need for cultivating a rhetoric of dissent that is free from demonization 
of the other. Interestingly, when considering Ivie‟s comments on the current state of 
American politics, Debs‟s opponents never resort to a “demonization of Debs and his 
followers” (Flehinger 18). Ivie critiques a rhetoric based on showmanship, which he 
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argues republicanism is prone to. He advocates an egalitarian discourse that situates the 
audience and speaker as equals. The ideal of this style of speaking to Ivie is Eugene 
Debs. Ivie writes, “[Debs] articulated this very democratic sensibility in his socialist 
stand against capitalism by locating himself within the ranks of the working masses 
rather than posing as a leader or representative of the people” (456). In this way, Debs 
becomes almost an ideal for Ivie and others in rhetorical studies. In relation to Ivie, my 
project explores why Debs should be considered to be a particular ideal: a parrhesiast. To 
do so, I highlight the qualities in Debs that warrant idealization by a comparison to others 
who do garner idealization.  
To understand Debs‟s use of parrhesia in 1912 is to move beyond an exploration 
of “[h]istory‟s sanctification of Eugene Debs […]” and toward an understanding of what 
makes Debs effective within his own times (Lee and Andrews 20). To identify how 
parrhesia manifests and functions in this period, this thesis will be organized to highlight 
the qualities of a parrhesiast that Debs possesses. In addition to a focus on Debs, each 
chapter will focus on one other candidate and one primary quality of parrhesia to 
illustrate Debs‟s differing approach as parrhesiast. For primary texts, each chapter will 
utilize speeches from the four candidates. The thesis will be structured as follows: 
Chapter two will focus on the comparison of Eugene Debs and William Howard 
Taft during the 1912 election. Of all the candidates, Taft stands in stark contrast to Debs. 
In terms of parrhesia, I will argue that the fundamental difference between Debs and Taft 
is Debs‟s presentation of having a compulsion to speak. Taft‟s campaign is marked by his 
reluctance to engage in the typical campaign activities and his hesitation to commit to 
Progressivism. Instead, he focused on political maneuvering rather than an appeal to the 
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electorate. For this reason, he is clearly engaging in a different practice from Debs, who 
demonstrates in his speeches a compulsion to offer frank criticism. The argument will be 
that Taft engaged in the 1912 election as a traditional candidate, but Debs participated as 
a parrehesiast compelled to speak out. This chapter will also include a response to James 
Darsey‟s classification of Debs‟s ethos as prophetic. I argue that labeling Debs as 
parrhesiast rather than prophet, as Darsey does, is more appropriate and consistent with 
his role as rhetor.  
Chapter three focuses on the contrasts between Woodrow Wilson and Eugene 
Debs, focusing on the quality of risk as the dividing factor between the two. Parrhesia 
requires the threat of detrimental consequence, a risk of some kind for offering frank 
criticism. Unlike Wilson, who had the backing of the Democratic Party and the political 
expertise of Tammany Hall Democrats, Debs had a considerably less organized political 
conglomerate. Unlike Wilson, Debs is less limited in his speech by the established party 
positions on issues. However, this freedom also comes with a risk for Debs. As an outside 
candidate, Debs runs the risk of angering one of his fellow candidates, who will no doubt 
be president. Of course, this is the case between the three other men as well. However, 
Debs does not have a party establishment to protect him, as Taft and Wilson do. He also 
does not have the authority that comes with being a past president, as Theodore 
Roosevelt does. Despite these risks, Debs does perform the role of parrhesiast in offering 
frank criticism for the benefit of the country. This chapter will also illustrate parrhesia‟s 
ability to connect with public memory. 
Chapter four focuses on the comparison of the campaign rhetoric of Theodore 
Roosevelt and Eugene Debs. As dissenters, both Roosevelt and Debs are in the unique 
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position to comment on issues and larger American political and economic structures; 
however, only Debs maintains a sense of parrhesia in his speeches for the benefit of the 
polis. Like Wilson, Debs accused Roosevelt of deliberately spreading falsehoods—the 
ultimate crime against Debs‟s virtue of parrhesia. More than any other candidate, Debs 
presents an image of Roosevelt as an ideological thief of Socialist principles to mask 
Roosevelt‟s opportunistic intentions. Of his presidential record, Debs found the lapses in 
truth for the sake of ambition the most reprehensible quality of the man. This position, of 
course, makes Roosevelt the opposite of the parreshiast and incapable of trust. Thus, this 
chapter will connect the differences between the two to the essential principle of 
authenticity. This chapter will argue that Debs was able to perform the role of parrhesiast, 
while Roosevelt was challenged in his ability to convey authenticity rather than ambition. 
Finally, the concluding chapter reviews the results of the 1912 campaign and how 
to situate Debs‟s achievement. The conclusion will position the distinguishing factor of 
Debs‟s campaign is a focus on parrhesia rather than politics. Finally, the chapter 
extrapolates the implications for the use of parrhesia in politics. Although parrhesia might 
not have served to elect Eugene Debs as President of the United States, it garnered him 




COMPULSION, TAFT, AND THE PROPHET 
Entering the large-scale political stage of a presidential election requires a certain 
tolerance for public scrutiny that some cannot withstand. Through countless speeches, 
appearances, and photo opportunities, candidates must engage with the public to garner 
the votes necessary for victory. Because of technological limitations in 1912, candidates 
had to dedicate considerable time and energy not just into their public performances but 
also into the extensive travel to and from campaign locations spanning the expanse of the 
American continent. With this reality, we might ask: what motivates these candidates to 
sacrifice their personal lives for the very public life of campaign politics?  
 William Howard Taft‟s answer would look very different from that of Eugene 
Victor Debs, and this fundamental difference can be further explained in terms of 
parrhesia. One characteristic of parrhesia, as Michel Foucault conceptualizes it, speaks to 
this chapter‟s central question. This characteristic might be called duty or compulsion. As 
will become apparent from an analysis of the compulsive quality of a parrhesiast, Taft 
and Debs stand at opposite ends of the spectrum. For Debs, the answer as to why he 
would enter the 1912 campaign is a matter of compulsion. He simply feels he must do so. 
It follows that his campaign rhetoric complements his conviction to offer frank criticism 
as a compulsive act. This almost extemporaneous effusion contrasts with Taft‟s measured 
establishment approach to his campaign. From the beginning, Taft lacked the compulsive 
drive of the parrhesiast
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 Taft‟s campaign is marked by his reluctance to engage in the typical campaign 
activities and his hesitation to commit to Progressivism. Instead, he focused on political 
maneuvering rather than a direct appeal to the electorate. For this reason, he is clearly 
engaging in a different practice from Debs, who demonstrates in his speeches a 
compulsion to offer frank criticism. This chapter will survey the political speeches of 
both men to highlight their differences to argue that Taft engaged in the 1912 election as 
a traditional candidate, but Debs participated as a parrhesiast compelled to speak out. To 
illustrate how this quality functions at the particular rhetorical moment of the 1912 
election, we should first explore the quality of compulsion in relation to parrhesia. 
 Much like finding the particular word “parrhesia” in the 1912 campaign speeches, 
it is a challenging task to locate the particular word “compulsion” in Michel Foucault‟s 
lectures at the Collège de France. This quality is generally translated as duty, as it is in 
Fearless Speech. However, it is important to keep in mind that Foucault‟s lectures were 
far from definitive. Instead, they were a means for him to publically work through some 
of the ideas and direction for his next project. Foucault even notes the fluctuating nature 
of the lectures himself in response to an audience member‟s comment. “[Y]ou know I 
never really know what I will be doing from one week to the next,” Foucault says 
(Courage of Truth 31). Thus, modifying some of Foucault‟s minor phrasings, such as 
“compulsion” for “duty,” might allow for us to move toward a closer meaning to a more 
holistic conception of parrhesia, avoid some unintended connotations of the term “duty,” 
and, if nothing else, provide at least a productive analysis of this particular context.  
 Foucault speaks directly to the necessity of compulsion as the motivation for a 
rhetor to be considered a parrhesiast. Foucault argues, “Not only must this truth really be 
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the personal opinion of the person who is speaking, but he must say it as being what he 
thinks, [and not] reluctantly—and this is what makes him a parrhesiast” (Courage of 
Truth 11). The parrhesiast, then, is one who displays no reluctance in speaking the truth, 
as he or she understands it. To Foucault, reluctance when one is speaking is absurd 
because the choice to speak involves an acknowledgement of the freedom to be silent. 
Foucault states, “The orator who speaks the truth to those who cannot accept his truth, for 
instance, and who may be exiled, or punished in some way, is free to keep silent. No one 
forces him to speak, but he feels that it is his duty to do so” (Fearless Speech 19). In this 
sense, duty involves a compulsion to oneself. One recognizes the truth and sees the need 
to speak out as a compulsive act toward oneself. Motivation must come from within. In 
this way, this facet of parrhesia is purely focused on interiority.  
 Motivation for speaking that is spurred solely from some external source, 
Foucault argues, cannot be parrhesia. He makes this point clearly when he argues:  
When, on the other hand, someone is compelled to tell the truth (as, for 
example, under duress of torture), then his discourse is not a parrhesiastic 
utterance. A criminal who is forced by his judges to confess his crime does 
not use parrhesia. But, if he voluntarily confesses his crime to someone 
else out of a sense of moral obligation, then he performs a parrhesiastic 
act. To criticize a friend or a sovereign is an act of parrhesia insofar as it 
is a duty to help a friend who does not recognize his wrongdoing, or 
insofar as it is a duty towards the city to help the king to better himself as 
a sovereign. Parrhesia is thus related to freedom and duty. (Foucault, 
Fearless Speech 19) 
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This passage illustrates the relationship between compulsion in relation to the interior and 
the exterior. The parrhesiast is one who is motivated by an internal compulsive desire to 
speak out, and in speaking out one‟s discourse must be motivated not by a desire to 
improve one‟s own material condition but to improve something external to oneself, such 
as the city or a friend. This is the strange internal/external relationship that underpins the 
compulsive quality of parrhesia.  
 In discussing the compulsive quality of parrhesia, it is almost inevitable to 
compare the prophet and the parrhesiast. Indeed, the compulsion to speak for the divine is 
a quality generally attributed to a prophet. These comparisons are especially appropriate 
when considering Debs, parrhesia, and, ultimately, Taft.  
Though not dealing explicitly with Debs‟s parrhesia, James Darsey‟s work on 
Debs illustrates the link between Debs‟s rhetorical effectiveness and his ethos. Darsey 
argues Debs rhetorically constructed himself in the image of the prophet, martyr, and vir 
bonus to strengthen his ethos. He writes, “What persists when the pragmatic, the formal, 
and the aesthetic have been stripped away is Debs the man, an ethical presence 
productive of and reflected and preserved in his speeches. Debs is Quintilian‟s vir bonus” 
(Darsey, “The Legend of Eugene Debs” 435). Darsey goes on to examine Debs‟s 
speeches and the elements that align with the characteristics of the prophet and martyr: 
charisma, conversion, sacrifice, and compulsion.  
Debs as a virtuous man compelled to offer frank criticism is explicit in Darsey‟s 
response to Patricia Roberts-Miller‟s theory of the demagogue. Of the qualities essential 
to label Debs Foucault‟s ideal of parrhesiast is the compulsion to speak the truth, and 
Darsey finds this quality throughout Debs‟s work. He writes, “While a demand for 
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personal allegiance would have been inconsistent with Debs‟s prophetic ethos, an ethos 
that depended on Debs‟s cultivation of a selfless persona, much of Debs‟s rhetoric is, 
nonetheless, compulsory. There is much talk of „duty,‟ and „must‟ is one of Debs‟s 
favorite verbs” (Darsey, “Patricia Robert-Miller” 468).  Elsewhere, Darsey illustrates to 
what end Debs as prophet deployed this association. Darsey convincingly asserts: 
Duty is the inescapable refrain of Debs‟s rhetoric. Like Martin Luther, 
Debs agitated. He could do no other. His agitation was an example of 
manly self-assertion. Debs tried to ensure that every time the working man 
closed his eyes to his duty, he would see the image of Debs bearing the 
cross of labor. As a suffering servant Debs transcended the role of the 
individual speaker. He became universal, symbolic. (“The Legend of 
Eugene Debs” 446) 
The goal of this association, Darsey argues, was for Debs “represent himself as a 
participant in the divine, a bearer of charism” (“The Legend of Eugene Debs” 441).  
 Darsey brings us to crucial question in considering Debs and parrhesiast: Can 
Debs be both parrhesiast and prophet? To phrase the question even more universally: Can 
one be a parrhesiast and prophet? Accordingly to Foucault, the answer is an unequivocal 
“no.” The reason being that parrhesia entails speaking one‟s truth, not another‟s.  He 
argues, “We can say then, very schematically, that the parrhesiast is not the prophet who 
speaks the truth when he reveals fate enigmatically in the name of someone else” 
(Foucault, Courage of Truth 25). The prophet is merely a channel for another‟s truth. 
Thus, the religious labeling of a prophet as “God‟s mouthpiece” removes agency from the 
prophet, who is reduced to a medium through which the divine message is transmitted. 
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This is quite opposed to the function of parrhesiast, who speaks truth as he or she 
understands it. The parrhesiast, therefore, is the sole active interpreter and transmitter of 
the message. Likewise, the compulsion of speaking on behalf of another as prophet 
effectively functions as duress, since the speaker is forced to speak by an external force. 
Because this speech is a kind of duress, this fact disqualifies the prophet‟s discourse as 
parrhesia. Though in this case the external force may be metaphysical and possibly 
delusional, the conclusion drawn from the principle of parrhesia remains the same: The 
prophet is compelled to speak by something other than a duty to oneself; therefore, the 
prophet‟s speech is not parrhesia. As this chapter‟s analysis will demonstrate, Debs was 
acting not as a prophet, as Darsey would argue, speaking for another entity. Instead, Debs 
acted as a parrhesiast speaking out of a compulsion to tell the truth.  
 In contrast to Debs, it is quite an interesting thought to consider William Howard 
Taft as anything approaching a parrhesiast. His predilection from the early stages of his 
life was for measured contemplation. As James Chace writes, “The law, not politics, was 
[Taft‟s] passion. This had been true ever since he was a very young man growing up in 
Cincinnati as the son of a judge who was also a member of President Grant‟s cabinet and 
a minister to Vienna and Saint Petersburg” (23). Despite this temperament for civil 
service rather than electoral politics, Taft found himself thrust into the presidency in what 
might be considered a form of gentle duress from a close friend.  
 Caught in the frenzy of a campaign victory in 1904, Theodore Roosevelt made 
what historians consider his biggest political error. Roosevelt vowed on election night to 
not run for a third term (Chace 23). Following his inauguration, Roosevelt‟s thoughts 
turned to naming his successor, which ultimately was Taft. In a letter to Senator Henry 
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Cabot Lodge, Roosevelt outlined why he considered Taft a worthy successor to his 
presidency. Roosevelt writes, “I do not believe a man so well fitted to be President. He is 
not only absolutely fearless, absolutely disinterested and upright, but he has the widest 
acquaintance with the nation‟s needs […]” (qtd. in Broderick 30). Roosevelt‟s idealized 
characterization of Taft might speak to his appropriateness as a parrhesiast. To Roosevelt, 
he is fearless.  
Ironically, Taft directly opposes this conception of himself by writing of his own 
fearful hatred of political campaign speaking. In 1904, he writes to Roosevelt: “I would 
not run for president if you guaranteed the office. It is awful to be made afraid of one‟s 
own shadow” (qtd. in Broderick 29). One might have expected this attitude to change 
during his own election in 1908, but Taft remained reluctant to enter the presidency and 
even more reluctant to engage with the public. Francis L. Broderick writes of the 
dynamic between Taft and Roosevelt: “[Taft] had no taste for canvassing for votes 
himself. Begging itself made the beggar unworthy of the gift. Roosevelt had no such 
qualms, and he sought to rub his lust for battle into his lethargic aide. Taft, alternatively 
grateful and resistant, essentially went his own way” (30). In his ambivalence toward the 
presidency, it is clear that Taft was almost impressed into running for office. His 
compulsion for running was the result of deference to Roosevelt and Taft‟s wife Nellie, 
who craved the presidency for her husband in spite of his dreams of serving as Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court (Chace 26). This initial and ultimately successful 
presidential bid illustrates the chief characteristic that prevents Taft from being 
considered a parrhesiast: a lack of compulsion. 
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 With the opportunity provided by Roosevelt‟s support, Taft missed the 
opportunity for the type of parrhesia that exists among friends. Foucault writes of such a 
situation: “We also find the obligation to be frank with one‟s friends and to say 
everything one has on one‟s mind” (Hermeneutics of the Subject 365). Yet, even in his 
microcosm, Taft does not enact parrhesia by disclosing his aversion to electoral politics. 
He finds no compulsion to frankly speak with his friend, or, as Foucault might phrase the 
situation, he does not display a duty to himself to speak. Instead, Taft‟s foray into 
political campaigning is the result of passivity rather than the active stance required of a 
parrhesiast and, one might suggest, a good president.  
 Once the office was his, Taft‟s administration continued to be defined by his 
reluctance. Broderick writes, “Though an active man who rode horseback and who 
played golf before gocarts reduced the game to sedentary socializing, he did not push 
himself to work until he had to, only at the last meeting a deadline with a kinetic spurt of 
energy” (31). Likewise, Taft viewed his obligation to his electorate as a mere formality. 
He remained detached in his presidential addresses speaking “as president, which he was, 
but not as politician, which he also was despite the dignity of his office” (Broderick 35). 
In this respect, Taft‟s reluctant discourse functions as a mere reflection of his 
administrative position. He lacks the close proximity between his speech and the personal 
reflection that it contains. Despite being the president, it is as if Taft‟s discourse reflects 
the office itself rather than the man. Of this detachment, Broderick writes, “Taft took 
grim satisfaction that: no one would sing his praises; both sides would blame him. The 
path of duty was more attractive than praise” (33). This maxim sounds eerily familiar to 
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qualities Foucault discusses in The Courage of Truth. Indeed, Taft‟s discourse might not 
be considered that of a parrhesiast but a prophet.  
 To consider Taft a prophet of in the religious sense would be absurd. After all, he 
turned down the presidency of Yale in 1899 because he did not believe “in the Divinity of 
Christ” (Chace 24). Taft‟s discourse, however, might be said to function in the prophetic 
sense because of its tendency to use the man as vessel for praise of the intangible. 
Foucault explains, “You can see then that the parrhesiast is the opposite of the prophet in 
that the prophet does not speak for himself, but in the name of someone else, and he 
articulates a voice which is not his own” (Courage of Truth 15). Taft speaks in a voice 
not his own, but in the name of the President of the United States, an office he never 
honestly sought in the first place. Like a prophet, Taft is speaking under a kind of duress: 
an obligation first to his wife, his friend in the campaign of 1908, and to the office of the 
presidency in 1912.  
In contrast to a parrhesiast, Taft seemingly saw no obligation to speak for the 
benefit of the citizens. The reason for this, Lewis L. Gould speculates, is that “[Taft] had 
likely given up any realistic hope for reelection in 1912 but was determined to gain a 
renomination and frustrate Roosevelt” (46). The result was that Taft placed considerably 
less importance on engaging with the electorate and instead focused on “exploiting the 
rules that favored an incumbent president to maximum effect” (Gould 46). By focusing 
on private political maneuverings rather than appeals to the American voters, Taft‟s 
campaign stands in stark contrast to the campaigns of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow 
Wilson, and especially Eugene Debs. In terms of parrhesia, the fundamental difference 
between Debs and Taft is the presentation of a compulsion to speak. By comparing the 
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two men, Foucault‟s conception of the compulsive quality of parrhesia becomes apparent 
in Debs and lacking in Taft.  
Compare Taft‟s reluctant start in presidential politics with Debs‟s. In 1900, the 
Socialist party nominated Debs, already an important figure in Socialism, for President of 
the United States. Taft‟s reluctance during his first foray into electoral politics came from 
the reluctance to speak to the citizens. Debs‟s initial hesitation was due to his health. He 
had proven throughout his outspoken life that speaking to the people was not an act he 
regarded as improper. Instead, his refusal was due to the sheer physical strain a campaign 
would place on an already ill man. Chace writes, “At first, Debs refused the nomination 
because of his health, but during the night he received delegations that begged him to 
reconsider. Finally, Berger wrested from him a reversal and so added to the legend that 
Debs had sacrificed his personal desire for repose for the good of the cause” (86). Thus, 
Debs‟s entry into presidential politics starkly differs from Taft‟s. Despite his health, Debs 
mounted a robust campaign in 1900, 1904, and 1908. In each of these campaigns, his 
health continued to be an issue. His doctors could only prescribe “[r]est and occasionally 
a special diet […]” (Chace 88). By 1912, his condition remained precarious.  
At fifty-six years old, Debs wrote to his brother Theodore of his health: “This is 
first day‟s work I‟ve done for 2 weeks & I‟m tired. Easter 2 a m was seized with spasm of 
lumbago—fell on floor & was helpless & suffered all the tortures of damnation until 2 or 
3 days ago. Thought I was done for” (Debs, Letters of Eugene Debs 472-3). Clearly, 
Debs‟s health was a formidable consideration when making the decision to enter the 1912 
election. Several conditions at the macro level of the United States but also at the micro 
level of the Socialist movement may have given Debs cause to see the platform of the 
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presidential campaign as a means to offer frank criticism for the benefit of everyone. 
Within the Socialist movement, William “Big Bill” Haywood, a socialist leader and co-
founder of the Industrial Workers of the World, used his speech making to link together 
various conceptions of working-class and resistance strategies to create a class unity. 
Unfortunately, Haywood encouraged violence to affect a Socialist revolution, which 
Debs felt compelled to speak out against in the press and urged the national convention to 
adopt a platform against “sabotage and terrorism but not to do so in a manner that further 
split the party” (Gould 113). Here, Debs‟s motivation speaks to his inward duty to 
himself to offer parrhesia to those in his movement and beyond. Importantly, he enters 
the political arena for the campaign of 1912 not under duress but freely.  
Likewise, in contrast to Taft‟s reluctance to campaign and speak to the people of 
the United States, Debs entered the campaign as an ailing man compelled to speak out, 
but not just for votes. Gould writes, “Holding office as an end in itself never appealed to 
him. He believed with passionate intensity that capitalism as a political and social system 
was doomed. If he could only convince his listeners of that simple proposition, he knew 
that the Socialist commonwealth would soon arrive” (106). One might question the 
naiveté of launching a national campaign and taxing one‟s body through arduous public 
performances, but this misses the point of Debs‟s conviction in the truth he was speaking 
and the importance of his speaking it. Understanding this action as a personal 
compulsion—the compulsive act of a parrhesiast—explains Debs‟s decision to engage in 
a political campaign with little hope of actually being elected. In a metaphoric description 
that recalls Socrates, who Foucault considers another parrhesiast, Gould calls Debs “a 
gadfly who could irate and provoke his rivals in the political system” (121). This 
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provocation is one of the functions of the parrhesiast as Foucault conceptualizes it. The 
parrhesiast is in a constant act of “speaking the truth in order to direct the city, in a 
position of superiority in which one is perpetually jousting with others” (Government of 
Self  157). Debs‟s jousting with his fellow candidates certainly exemplifies this act.  
This personal commitment to parrhesia as found in Debs‟s campaign once again 
differs from Taft‟s approach, which is characterized by a lack of compulsion. In his 
campaign, Taft‟s style appears remote. Because of his lack of compulsion to engage in 
campaign speeches, Taft becomes a spectator rather than a participant in the election 
process (Broderick 163).  Broderick writes, “The President himself, having no taste for 
tilting at the inexorable, would observe the formalities of candidacy, but basically, he 
would remain a spectator, unabashedly presidential” (163). Again, like the prophet rather 
than parrhesiast, Taft‟s distancing allowed him to speak ex-cathedra as President of the 
United States but certainly not as a speaker offering frank criticism. When challenged to 
a debate with Debs, the reply from Taft‟s office articulates Taft‟s removal from public 
engagement: “President regrets that he cannot accept invitation extended, as he is taking 
no active part in the campaign” (qtd. in Broderick 179). Instead of seeing the campaign as 
an opportunity to connect with his electorate and speak for their benefit, Taft only spoke 
through the Office of the President, just as the prophet‟s speech speaks for the intangible.  
Unlike Debs, Taft was not compelled to speak as himself for others. Because of 
Taft‟s reluctance to engage in campaign politics, there are few open engagements 
between Taft and Debs. Indeed, Debs had already written Taft “out of the race” because 
of his refusal to participate in traditional campaigning (qtd. in Broderick 179). However, 
an analysis of the acceptance speeches from both men from their respective parties 
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illustrates how Debs‟s compulsive, parrhesiastic approach contrasts with Taft‟s reluctant, 
regal discourse.   
 Taft‟s acceptance speech begins by noting the extreme circumstances in which the 
Republican National Convention took place. During the convention, Taft and Roosevelt 
squared off for the nomination, resulting in Roosevelt and breakaway Republicans 
forming the Progressive Party, also known as the Bull Moose Party. Roosevelt‟s 
candidacy, which would have been the first third term sought by a president, earned him 
Taft‟s ire. His anger is somewhat surprising considering Taft‟s disdain for the 
responsibilities that being the President of the United States entails. One might think that 
Taft would happily have cast off the burden of President, but Taft‟s acceptance speech 
illustrates his motivation. Early in his speech, Taft announces, “A faction sought to force 
the party to violate a valuable and time-honored national tradition by intrusting [sic] the 
power of the Presidency for more than two terms to one man, […]” (5). It is clear from 
his opening remarks that Taft sees his great battle not as one directed toward the people 
of the United States but focused on the preservation of the Republican Party from 
Roosevelt‟s ambitions. Thus, we can see that Taft‟s motivation for the 1912 campaign 
was not to speak for the sake of benefiting the citizenry as a parrhesiast. Once again, 
Roosevelt serves as the main driver for Taft‟s entry.  
 By attaining the mantle of Republican Presidential Nominee, of course, Taft was 
by no means guaranteed a second term in office, but, as this chapter has shown, he 
approached the latter stage of the campaign—the stage of the campaign that involves 
public engagement—at best without earnest. Yet, Taft‟s acceptance speech sounds as if it 
were announcing the final victory. For Taft, it did serve that purpose. Referring again to 
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Roosevelt‟s ouster from the Republican Party, Taft declares, “This occasion is 
appropriate for the expression of profound gratitude at the victory for the fight which was 
won in Chicago. By that victory the Republican Party was saved for future usefulness” 
(5). This language suggests how Taft viewed his mission in 1912. Quite clearly, the 
“profound victory” Taft envisioned was the prevention of Theodore Roosevelt from 
being nominated as President by the Republican Party. With his mission complete, one 
might understand Taft‟s lackadaisical attitude toward the latter and crucial stage of the 
campaign as his lack of compulsion for parrhesia.  
The stage at which Taft seemed to see his mission was in outmaneuvering 
Roosevelt for the nomination. To achieve this victory required quiet, contemplative, and 
calculating tactics, which was in Taft‟s nature. This differs from the compulsive drive for 
public performance that defines a parrhesiast. Public engagement was far from Taft‟s 
campaign direction. As Broderick writes, “Official remarks now and again would show 
that his party still lived, but he had no intention of romping around” (183). Instead, Taft 
preferred “moseying on the golf course of Massachusetts with an occasional side trip into 
neighboring states, the certainty of defeat and the obligation of presidential dignity 
shaped his conduct” (Broderick 183). Taft‟s acceptance speech foreshadows his 
campaign tactics. 
If Taft‟s private writings did not make his disdain for public performance 
apparent, his acceptance speech makes his feelings obvious. He hopes “the great majority 
of voters will be able to distinguish between the substance of performance and the fustian 
of promise […]” (Taft 20). As would be expected for any electoral campaign, Taft‟s 
opponents do find public performance to substantive and, indeed, necessary. Yet, Taft 
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finds these tactics as a means to leave the public “confused and misled and diverted from 
the truth […] [by] bubbles of demagogic promise which the discussions of a campaign 
ma[k]e possible, […].” ( Taft 21). Again, it is clear that Taft despises the active politics 
of speechifying. Of course, without speech there cannot be parrhesia.  
Finally, Taft‟s acceptance speech conveys the central essence that prevents him 
from assuming the mantel of parrhesiast: his reluctance. Taft‟s philosophy of careful 
consideration over compulsive action comes through in his answer to Socialism. 
Responding to the increasing wealth inequality, Taft concedes the wealthy concentration 
of capital as “one incidental evil of a great expansive movement in the material progress 
of the world […]” (9). What should one do in response to this identified “evil”? What 
action is the government doing to mitigate what its executive officer identifies as “evil”? 
Taft responds, “It is far better to await the diminution of this evil by natural causes […]” 
(9). This passivity is the typical of Taft‟s personality. It should, therefore, be no surprise 
that he displays no compulsion to speak out for the benefit of his citizens. Compulsion 
demands action.  
Unlike Taft‟s passivity, Debs‟s acceptance speech defines his motivation in 
accepting the nomination and situates the conduct of his party in terms of action. In terms 
of parrhesia, Debs‟s speech opens by evoking the complex balance of internal/external 
that Foucault mentions as the motivating force for a parrhesiast to speak. Debs 
announces: 
It is with a full sense of the responsibility it imposes and the service it 
exacts that I accept the nomination for president tendered to me by the 
Socialist Party of the United States. Personally I did not wish the 
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nomination. It came to me unsought. It came as summons to service and 
not as a personal honor. Every true member of the Socialist Party is at the 
party‟s service. (“Speech of Acceptance” 361) 
In these introductory statements, we can see Debs recalling the parrhesiast‟s 
internal/external balance. Debs positions himself as motivated by an internal compulsive 
desire to act, what he calls a “summons to service.” It is a service he considers no 
different from the various services a “true member of the Socialist Party” should render. 
This sensibility is similar to that of the parrhesiast, according to Foucault, who takes a 
leadership position temporarily in order to speak out for the benefit of the citizenry 
(Government of Self 157). In choosing to speak, the parrhesiast‟s discourse must be 
motivated not by a desire to improve one‟s own material condition. This can certainly be 
the case with Debs, whose speech argues he is accepting the nomination for reasons other 
than “personal honor.” Instead, as a parrhesiast should, he announces his intent to 
improve something external to himself: Debs articulates that he is for “the emancipation 
of the working class from wage-slavery, for the equal rights and opportunities [for] all 
men and all women, for the abolition of child labor and the conservation of all childhood, 
for social self-rule and the equal freedom of all, […]” (Debs, “Speech of Acceptance” 
366). In essence, Debs‟s audience is not just his party but the majority of Americans, 
which for him is encapsulated in the phrase “the people.”  
In this way, this practice of parrhesia aligns with democratic dissent, as 
conceptualized by Robert Ivie. Ivie writes, “As a leveling rather than leadership style, a 
democratic rhetoric is quintessentially a discourse of dissent rather than a discourse of 
governance […] Rather than governing in a traditional sense, democracy exists in the 
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„fugitive‟ status of a practice of resistance” (456). Complementarily, Foucault argues, 
“democracy in general is characterized or specified only by these two elements or options 
(isēgoria and parrēsia)” (Government of Self 150). Debs‟s participation within the 
American democratic framework might be read by some as contradictory to his radical 
call for change, but, as Foucault demonstrates, “For there to be democracy there must be 
parrēsia; for there to be parrēsia there must be a democracy” (Government of Self 155). 
Thus, these two seemingly contradictory practices (democratic dissent and parrhesia) 
align perfectly with Debs‟s candidacy in 1912. After all, Debs makes instilling a more 
perfect democracy his party‟s mission when he declares, “The Socialist Party‟s mission is 
not only to destroy capitalist despotism but to establish industrial and social democracy” 
(“Speech of Acceptance” 366). These practices can be reconciled despite the irony of a 
definite leader within the Socialist Party running for the Presidency within a system of 
government that the party despises. 
Perhaps the most interesting comparison between the two men is in how they 
react to the growing economic disparity in America. Taft labels this “evil” but resigns to 
letting it passively die of “natural causes.” Debs, however, intends not to promote 
acquiescence but to motivate active change. Debs declares his mission is to “abolish this 
monstrous system and the misery and crime which flow from it in a direful and 
threatening stream  […]” (“Speech of Acceptance” 365). Importantly for his role as 
parrhesiast, Debs articulates that this action will be accomplished by “appeal[ing] to the 
intelligence and conscience of the people” (“Speech of Acceptance” 365-6). Thus, by 
offering parrhesia, Debs hopes to “speak[…] the truth in order to direct the city,” as 
Foucault says in The Government of Self and Others, to action (157). Conversely, Taft‟s 
 29 
speech seems only to serve as a direction of inaction.  
Foucault‟s last lectures attempt to articulate a way of thinking about the act of 
telling the truth through what he calls four “fundamental modes of truth-telling” 
(Courage of Truth 27). The modes are comprised of the prophet, sage, technician, or 
parrhesiast (Foucault, Courage of Truth 28). What Foucault does not specify through 
these modes is what role modality of truth does the politician use to operate? Perhaps 
Foucault might have argued that the political is always already caught up in the work of 
the parrhesiast. Yet, Foucault seems to suggest that parrhesia may have disappeared from 
modern life (Courage of Truth 30). However, had Foucault considered Eugene Debs he 
might have tentatively recognized Debs‟s practices in 1912 as those of a modern-day 
parrhesiast. As a comparison with Taft reveals, one important bridge between the 
politician and parrhesiast is motivation.  
This leads circuitously back to the question that opened this chapter: What 
motivates these candidates to sacrifice their personal lives for the very public life of 
campaign politics? Arriving at an answer need not require psychological examination of 
Taft, Roosevelt, Wilson, and Debs. Although not a traditional politician, Debs‟s greatest 
lesson might be that parrhesia need not be considered anathema to politics. Indeed, it can 
be a spur to political action.  
Compulsion, as this chapter has shown, can lead to positive political action, as in 
the case of Debs, and when it is lacking, as demonstrated with Taft, it leads to a negative 
experience for both the politician and the public. Therefore, parrhesiastic compulsion can 
be beneficial as a force for motivation. Parrhesiastic compulsion can account for: 
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motivation to begin an engagement, motivation for action during an engagement, and 
motivation to continue the engagement to its conclusion.   
In terms of motivation to begin an engagement, Debs‟s compulsion for parrhesia 
seems to give him an advantage.  Because of the internal duty to himself and the external 
duty to others, Debs seemingly overcame his health-related limitations to such a degree 
that he performed in a comprehensive and energetic set of speaking engagements 
throughout the campaign of 1912. It is not difficult to imagine another politician existing 
with very similar political theories and social reimaginings as Debs but lacking the sense 
of compulsion to articulate them recurrently and publically on the national stage of 
electoral politics.  
Likewise, the motivation for action during an engagement is evident in Debs‟s 
conduct throughout the campaign. Not only does he travel the country to speak to large 
crowds, but the messages of his speeches are those calling others to action, as is the case 
in Debs‟s “Speech of Acceptance.” For a parrhesiast, this makes sense because one is 
compelled to act in offering frank criticism and, almost inevitably, the drive for action 
would seep into one‟s discourse. This presents an advantage to a parrhesiast engaging in 
an elective campaign because of the tendency for voters to prefer messages of action and 
change to messages of passivity and stasis.   
Motivation to continue the engagement to its conclusion, or simply perseverance, 
the compulsive duty to oneself and others could offer an advantage in an election. This 
duty to oneself and others could serve as an inducement for continued campaigning. One 
might argue a lack of perseverance was a major contributor to Taft‟s failure in 1912. As 
his acceptance speech makes clear, his victory ended before the general campaign began. 
 31 
This was not a problem shared by Eugene Debs, and it should not be a hindrance for any 
parrhesiast. After all, a parrhesiast is motivated by a desire for action: speaking what one 
considers truth for the benefit of a group, whether it is a city in antiquity or a country in 
modernity. If understood as a compulsive duty, this mission is almost never-ending.  
In these three senses, the compulsion of parrhesia might partially explain how 
Debs came to rise to the top in his party and even appeal to voters beyond the party in 
1912. Compulsion, or what he called duty, is one of the essential qualities necessary to 
distinguish a parrhesiast from just an orator. Using this measure, through his discourse 
and actions, Eugene Debs functioned as a parrhesiast during the 1912 campaign. This 
conclusion only becomes more apparent when Debs is weighed against Taft on the scale 




RISK, WILSON, AND COURAGE 
Risk is an inevitable element in any activity, and certainly an electoral campaign. 
A variety of risks must have factored into campaigners‟ minds during the election of 
1912: the risk of acquiring the necessary funds to finance a large-scale campaign, the risk 
of public humiliation, and perhaps the most concerning risk: failure. All of these risks are 
not uncommon. However, this chapter will not focus on these ordinary political risks  
because Eugene Debs must be considered only secondarily a politician. Instead, I will 
focus on the unique risks that Debs faces as a parrhesiast. These parrhesiastic risks 
become all the more apparent when comparing Debs to the Democratic Presidential 
Nominee Woodrow Wilson.  
 Michel Foucault considers the component of risk to be an essential element of a 
parrhesiast. Risk is essential not in and of itself, but because it is a condition for courage. 
Foucault is explicit in his explanation of the essentialness of risk when he states: “For 
there to be parrhēsia, […] the subject must be taking some kind of risk [in speaking] this 
truth which he signs as his opinion, his thought, his belief, […]” (Courage of Truth 11). 
In this way, courage and risk become almost inseparable.   
Parrhesia involves two principal risks: the risk of harm against the speaker for the 
content of his or her speech and the risk of rupturing the relationship between the speaker 
and his or her audience, which can consist of a single individual or a group. Thus, these 
two consequences can perhaps be simplified and combined into a single risk for the 
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parrhesiast: the risk of offense. Of course, offense is subjective and unpredictable, and 
any speech might give offense unintentionally. However, this is different in the case of 
the parrhesiast. Like the parrhesiastic element of compulsion, which was the focus of the 
previous chapter, the speaker offering frank criticism must be cognizant of the particular 
risk of his or her parrhesia. Otherwise, the act of speaking could not be considered 
particularly courageous, as Foucault conceptualizes of parrhesia. 
Parrhesia, as conceptualized by Foucault, cannot be blindness to the consequences 
of the utterance. Indeed, the rhetor must understand the risks of speaking, including “the 
risk of not being heard by the other party or parties or of being silenced entirely, […]” 
(Walzer 4-5). Thus, parrhesia “involves some form of courage, the minimal form of 
which consists in the parreshiast taking the risk of breaking and ending the relationship to 
the other person which was precisely what made his discourse possible” (Foucault, 
Courage of Truth 11). These intermingled concepts of risk and courage became so crucial 
for Foucault that he devoted his final lecture at the Collège de France to “the courage of 
truth.” It is this concept of courage in speaking that nearly comes to define parrhesia for 
Foucault. This is evident when he argues: “So, in two words, parrhēsia is the courage of 
truth in the person who speaks and who, regardless of everything, takes the risk of telling 
the whole truth that he thinks, but it is also the interlocutor‟s courage in agreeing to 
accept the hurtful truth that he hears” (Foucault, Courage of Truth 13). Foucault‟s 
parrhesia is “a passion, since it entails an emotional investment, and a virtue, insofar as it 
is still linked to courage” (Lévy 314).  
            This difference is understandable in terms of the function of the parrhesiast. The 
parrhesiast must not censor or even moderate his or her speech depending on the 
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audience he or she is addressing, which is clearly the opposite of traditional electoral 
political strategy. Indeed, parrhesia is almost the opposite of strategic communication or 
what Foucault unfortunately labels “rhetoric” (Courage of Truth 13-4). Parrhesia might 
be considered an almost visceral response. Foucault makes this point clear when he 
argues that “in parrhēsia there is no question of saying anything other than what one 
thinks” (Courage of Truth 13). This visceral response almost always takes place because 
of a reaction to a condition in need of rectification. In this way, the parrhesiast is always 
an agent for change. Through his or her speech, the parrhesiast acts as a gadfly for action. 
Because of this, the parrhesiast always incurs risk on a different level from any speaker 
who might haphazardly provoke a negative consequence from speaking. 
Because of the relationship between parrhesia and disrupting the status quo, the 
act of frank speaking naturally incurs a particular kind of risk because of the power 
dynamics that are inherent in parrhesia. As Bradford Vivian writes, “The fearless speaker 
is a figure, a form, of ethical practice: a subject compelled to speak what he or she 
understands as true irrespective of majority opinion—to speak it, in the relevant episteme, 
without adapting words for the sake of hearers, propriety, or situation […] The parrēsia 
requires the prime virtue of courage, not technique” (370). In speaking in order to change 
a condition, the parrhesiast comes into direct conflict with the very powers that benefit 
from the status quo, which can have serious consequences. Of parrhesia‟s potentially 
deadly consequences, Foucault declares, “Parrhēsia therefore not only puts the 
relationship between the person who speaks and the person to whom he addresses the 
truth at risk, but it may go so far as to put the very life of the person who speaks at risk, at 
least if his interlocutor has power over him and cannot bear being told the truth” 
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(Courage of Truth 12).  By seeking to alter the structure of authority by shifting the status 
quo, the parrhesiast must acknowledge that in speaking he or she is making enemies from 
powerful entities, which may be individuals or institutions or perhaps both. Therein lies 
the element of courage that Foucault finds so essential to parrhesia. As an example, 
Foucault cites Plato‟s frank criticism of Dionysius. Foucault states: 
[W]hen a philosopher addresses himself to a sovereign, to a tyrant, and 
tells him that his tyranny is disturbing and unpleasant because tyranny is 
incompatible with justice, then the philosopher speaks the truth, believes 
he is speaking the truth, and, more than that, also takes a risk (since the 
tyrant may become angry, may punish him, may exile him, may kill him). 
(Fearless Truth 16) 
However, the risk of parrhesia is not limited to the singular transmittal of advice to 
another.  
In the political arena, parrhesia carries another set of risks beyond one‟s identified 
interlocutor. As Foucault argues, “If, in a political debate, an orator risks losing his 
popularity because his opinions are contrary to the majority's opinion, or his opinions 
may usher in a political scandal, he uses parrhesia” (Fearless Truth 16). Importantly for 
a discussion of electoral politics, one must consider risks beyond offending one‟s 
political opponent. The risk of speaking also involves the potential for alienating 
members of the audience. This pressure to be all things to many is one that any electoral 
politician understands.  The response to this pressure is what divides Woodrow Wilson 
and Eugene Debs.  
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Unlike Wilson, who had the backing of the Democratic Party and the political 
expertise of Democratic political bosses at his disposal, Debs had a considerably less 
organized political conglomerate. Unlike Wilson, Debs is less limited in his speech by the 
established party positions on issues. However, this freedom also comes with a risk for 
Debs. As an outside candidate, Debs runs the risk of angering one of his fellow 
candidates, who will no doubt be president. Unlike Taft and Wilson, Debs does not have 
a party establishment to protect him, and he also does not have the authority that comes 
with being a past president, as Theodore Roosevelt does. Despite these risks, Debs 
performs the role of parrhesiast in offering frank criticism for the benefit of the country. 
Wilson‟s avoidance of frank speaking due to risk makes sense considering the 
political situation of the 1912 election, but it is also understandable because of Wilson‟s 
close ties to political bosses. This association began during his 1907 run for Governor of 
New Jersey. Likely chosen due to his status as a conservative Democrat, Wilson was 
lured by party bosses from the presidency of Princeton because of his appeal as a safe 
choice (Broderick 62). Bosses regarded Wilson “as a man of national structure who, all 
the while, offered no threat to the interests that made the nation prosperous” (Broderick 
63). In short, Wilson was seen as a palatable choice for big business and the constituents 
in the boss system of American politics. Indeed, Wilson crafted a political credo that “the 
most conservative paper in the United States,” The New York Sun, approved (Chace 51). 
These established ties would serve Wilson well financially during the 1912 election. As 
Lewis Gould writes, “Wilson was the Democratic hopeful with the closest claim to 
national organization, funded by his wealthy friends […] Thanks to Wilson‟s well-heeled 
backers his presidential campaign could count on some timely financial support […]” 
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(80). However, Wilson could not afford to stand on these platforms while running a 
national race. He had to balance the risk of offending his wealthy allies with the average 
American voter.  
Wilson maintained this balance by cultivating a discourse adaptable to any 
occasion, the opposite of parrhesia. When questioned about a history text he wrote that 
decried Eastern European immigrants, Wilson argued he was being misunderstood. He 
wrote of his tactic to Nicholas L. Piotrowski as “grazing the truth” (qtd. in Gould 84). In 
another example of this tactic, prior to the campaign, Wilson spoke out against William 
Jennings Bryan‟s radical advocating for a silver-based currency, “which horrified the 
banking and industrial interests of the East” (Chace 40). However, during the campaign, 
Wilson recognized Bryan as essential to attaining the Democratic nomination, Wilson 
abruptly publically spoke of “the character and the devotion and the preaching of William 
Jennings Bryan” as a “fixed point in the history of the Democratic party” (qtd. in Gould 
85). In one speech before Democratic workers, Wilson argues, “We, gentleman, […] are 
free to serve the people of the United States, and in my opinion it was Mr. Bryan that set 
us free” (343). Likewise, his previous views on organized labor could not stand the trial 
of national politics, and Wilson had “to repudiate almost everything he had said 
previously about the ills of labor unions” (Chace 52). However, this did not mean that 
Wilson reconsidered his prior views in favor of labor over business.  
Instead, Wilson saw that “a Democratic presidential candidate could not identify 
himself with anything like the activism that Roosevelt embraces. […] [Wilson‟s] reform 
impulse was cautious and limited” (Gould 163). One of the results of this was a 
compromise that avoids the risk of alienating average American workers and the business 
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interests to which Wilson and the party were indebted. He achieved this through a 
rhetorical separation of big business, which he viewed as a positive force for America, 
and trusts, which were a negative consequence of a market not organized for optimal 
competition (Broderick 141). Gould writes, “He promised that, if elected, the Democrats 
would move slowly in revising custom duties downward so that business interests would 
not be disturbed” (81). Certainly, this is the work of a skilled politician and strategic 
rhetor. However, because this strategy relies on significantly altering one‟s position to 
avoid offense, it cannot be considered parrhesia.  
Debs‟s position could not be more different than Woodrow Wilson‟s. As a result 
of his successful strikes in the 1890s, he did not have the respect of large institutions, 
such as the Great Northern Railroad (Chace 76). For his role in the Pullman strike, Debs 
earned the ire of President Grover Cleveland, who signed an injunction preventing strike 
leaders from aiding an ongoing boycott. Cleveland admitted that the injunction was 
“aimed against Eugene V. Debs” (Chace 78). As a result, Debs faced court cases and 
appeals leading to the United States Supreme Court, which ruled Debs and other strike 
leaders violated the injunction (Chace 80). Thus, Debs was forced to continue to serve his 
six-month sentence at the McHenry County Jail in Woodstock, Illinois. The experience 
awakened him to the ideology of Socialism and brought him the scorn of powerful 
figures and institutions, including the President of the United States and the United States 
Supreme Court. By the time he considered running in 1912 for the presidency, Debs‟s 
background as activist and convict left him vulnerable to considerable risk. 
Unlike Wilson, Debs did not have close ties to financial forces, making his 
success in the 1912 election all the more remarkable considering his “little money and 
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less political machinery” (Broderick 184). Morgan speculates, “Perhaps the answer is that 
there is a tradition of American radicalism and that Eugene Debs conformed to that 
tradition as much as any American radical” (120). Although Debs was certainly engaged 
in radical politics, he somehow made this palatable to a larger population of citizens 
within the American mode of dissent. Debs characterized Wilson in an editorial as “a 
mild-mannered gentleman, ladylike in his utterances, and I have nothing to say against 
him personally, and politically he had nothing to say for himself. He is the kid glove on 
the paw of the Tammany tiger” (qtd. in Broderick 180). Here, Debs utilizes Wilson‟s 
connections with the party bosses of Tammany Hall, distancing him from the common 
American.  
This characterization, of course, runs counter to Wilson‟s presentation of himself. 
Wilson writes, “For most of us are average men; very few of us rise, except by fortunate 
accident, above the general level of the community about us, and therefore the man who 
thinks the common thoughts, the man who has had the common experiences, is most 
always the man who interprets America aright” (448). Wilson goes to great lengths to use 
the unifying pronoun of “us,” creating the impression that he is an average man, and even 
downplaying his educational status by saying, “I haven‟t any education to boast of, […]” 
(448). However, by virtue of his connections with the powerful institutions that 
undermine the collective power of the common voters, Debs positions Wilson as 
incapable of objectively representing the great mass of American workers. He is instead 
indebted to the political and business leaders that authorize his candidacy and finance his 
campaign. Debs states, “[Wilson] was seized upon as a „progressive‟; as a man who 
would appeal to the common people, but he never could have been nominated without the 
 40 
votes controlled by Tammany and the „predatory interests‟ so fiercely denounced in the 
convention by William Jennings Bryan” (“The Fight for Freedom” 308-309). Debs makes 
the credibility of Wilson‟s character the central critique of his candidacy.  
Debs even goes as far as to label Wilson‟s appeal to the working class as one 
based on expediency rather than honesty; in short, an avoidance of risk. Debs argues, 
“Mr. Wilson is no more the candidate of the working class than is Mr. Taft or Mr. 
Roosevelt. Neither one of them has ever been identified with the working class, has ever 
associated with the working class, except when their votes were wanted, or would dare to 
avow himself the candidate of the working class” (“The Fight for Freedom” 310). Here, 
Debs as parreshiast separates himself from Wilson, who, he argues, is falsely presenting 
himself as a member of the working class. 
This depiction of Wilson stands in contrast to Debs‟s presentation of himself as a 
man rising with his people. Importantly for Debs‟s presentation as a parreshiast, he 
questions Wilson‟s sincerity. Debs notes, “Wilson is entering the campaign as a 
„progressive,‟ a great friend of the workers. He has a rotten labor record as any man 
possibly could have” (qtd. in Broderick 173). Thus, Debs attempts to undermine Wilson‟s 
ethos by challenging his honesty, which Debs‟s uses to demonstrate how any member of 
the capitalist class cannot be expected to honestly represent the average American 
worker. He argues, “Intelligent workingmen are no longer deceived. They know that the 
struggle in which the world is engaged today is a class struggle and that in this struggle 
the workers can never win by giving their votes to capitalist parties” (Debs, “Speech of 
Acceptance” 364). Debs further illustrates the coalition of capitalistic parties by 
presenting cohesion between Wilson‟s reformist Democratic Party and Taft‟s 
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conservative Republican Party, reinforcing Debs‟s characterization of Wilson candidacy 
as deception.  
 Wilson initially maintained a friendly response to Debs‟s party. Before a 
Democratic meeting in Buffalo, Wilson declares, “I have a great respect for the Socialist 
party, because I know how many honest and serious men are in it” (90). However, 
because of the conservative perception of the incumbent party under Taft, he is quick to 
differentiate the Democratic Party from Taft‟s Republicans. Importantly for a discussion 
of parrhesia, like Debs, Wilson links the Republican Party with untrustworthiness and 
makes its credibility a central issue. He accuses, “If it [the Republican Party] has not been 
able to keep those things from happening which have wrought a deep evil upon us, it has 
proved its impotence; whereas, if it deliberately did these things, it has proved its 
untrustworthiness” (Wilson 91). Crucial to Wilson‟s rhetorical strategy is creating a 
binary between the Republican and Democratic agenda, with the Democrats being the 
party of reform and the Republicans being the party of the status quo. However, Debs‟s 
strategy is to inextricably link the Democratic Party with the Republicans to damage their 
credibility and increase the Socialist Party‟s parrhesia. In contrast to Wilson‟s message of 
differentiation, Debs asserts: 
The Democratic party, like its Republican ally, is a capitalist party, the 
only difference being that it represents the minor divisions of the capitalist 
class. […] The Democratic party, like the Republican party, is financed by 
the capitalist class. […] Both the Republican and Democratic parties reek 
with corruption in their servility to the capitalist class, and both are torn 
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with strife in their mad scramble for the spoils of office. (“The Fight for 
Freedom” 307-308; 311) 
He goes on to appropriate Wilson‟s own charge of impotency toward the Republican 
Party against the Democrats. Debs argues, “The Democratic party has had little excuse 
for existence since the Civil War, and its utter impotency to deal with present conditions 
was made glaringly manifest during its brief lease of power under the Cleveland 
administration” (“The Fight for Freedom” 311-312). Thus, by utilizing the same 
accusations Wilson leveled against his Republican opponent, Debs, through multiple 
ethical accusations, binds the Democratic platform with that of the Republican Party. 
Wilson‟s characterization of the Democrats as a distinct entity from the Republicans is, to 
Debs, a deliberate falsity clearly motivated by political expediency rather than 
authenticity. More importantly, Wilson‟s identification with the working class is political 
opportunism, which to Debs, as parrhesiast, is inexcusable. Debs must, as parrhesiast, 
speak out against these falsehoods and, in doing so, risk the wrath of these powerful 
institutions and men.  
 In terms of risk, Wilson‟s discourse is much more moderated, as one would 
expect from a candidate with close ties to political establishments. His “Government for 
the Average Man” speech is illustrative of his attempt to broaden his rhetoric to largest 
possible audience while maintaining a conciliatory tone with special interest 
organizations. Wilson‟s argument is that the men who are not “deliberately doing a 
wrong to their fellow citizens, […]” but that were merely ignorant of the needs of the 
common American citizen (447). Wilson articulates his political philosophy with a spirit 
of understanding. However, this is obviously a philosophy that attempts to strategically 
 43 
avoid all risk by moderating one‟s speech. Wilson declares, “There are many things to be 
said which would explain their power without condemning the men who have been 
associated with that power. I do think we ought to approach our politics and our political 
problems in the spirit of condemnation, but merely in the spirit of those who see the 
facts” (447). The facts for Wilson are seemingly mutable to a given situation.  
This is particularly apparent later in the speech when Wilson addresses the 
criticisms of his professorial nature as incompatible with national politics. Wilson says, 
“Now, I am supposed to be an educated man, though I must admit to you that I haven‟t 
any education to boast of, […]” (448). This statement is quite interesting in its illustration 
of the mutability of the facts of Wilson‟s life. He remains the only President of the United 
States to hold a Ph.D. Wilson attended Davidson College, completed his undergraduate 
degree at Princeton University, briefly attended the University Of Virginia School Of 
Law, and earned a Doctorate of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. By any 
standard, he arguably had an education “to boast of.” Wilson goes to great length to 
increase his identification from the average voter. In this way, Wilson avoids the risk that 
comes from speaking too harshly and drawing offense, and he certainly fulfills the role of 
a skilled rhetor. However, because of his fluidity, he would not qualify for a parrhesiast. 
Wilson is too interested in projecting a desire for inclusivity, and a parrhesiast typically 
operates from a position outside of the mainstream. 
Foucault discusses the outsider status of parrhesia in several of the lectures 
contained in Government of the Self and Others through his focus on Euripides‟s Ion, 
which offered “some elements concerning the theoretical content of the notion of 
parrēsia” (151). As a character, Ion “does not belong to any of the major mythical sets of 
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Greek heritage and who does not have a place in any of the known cultic practices” 
(Foucault, Government of Self 76). He is thus occupying a similar position to Debs as a 
political outsider. In Ion‟s choice to speak out against tyrannical rule, Foucault argues: 
 We see a second practice, which is connected to situations of injustice, 
and which far from the right exercised by the powerful over his fellow 
citizens in order to guide them, is instead the cry of the powerless against 
someone who misuses his own strength. This, which is not [designated as] 
parrēsia in the text, but will be later, is what could be called judicial 
parrēsia. (Government of Self 154) 
Ion‟s practice of speaking on behalf of an oppressed citizenry parallels with Debs‟s 
presentation of judicial parrēsia speaking on behalf of oppressed American workers. 
Through this practice, Debs seeks to help Americans realize their right to speak out 
similarly. Debs makes his role of educator explicit when he says: 
Comrades and friends, the campaign before us gives us our supreme 
opportunity to reach the American people. They have but to know the true 
meaning of Socialism to accept its philosophy and the true mission of the 
Socialist party to give it their support. Let us all unite as we never have 
before to place the issue of Socialism squarely before the masses. For 
years they have been deceived, misled and betrayed, and they are now 
hungering for the true gospel of relief and the true message of 
emancipation. (“Political Appeal” 296)  
This passage illustrates many of the familiar themes for Debs as parrhesiast. Debs points 
again to the importance of educating the larger public on certain crucial truths: the truth 
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of Socialist philosophy, the truth of the party, and the true means of citizens gaining their 
fundamental rights. Importantly, he does not ask for others to blindly follow him as their 
leader, which would violate his role as parrhesiast.  
In another campaign speech, Debs implores his audience to educate themselves on 
the truth. He says, “I am not asking you to give your votes to this party but only that you 
read its platform, study its program, and satisfy yourself as to what its principles are, 
what it stands for, and what it expects to accomplish” (Debs, “The Fight for Freedom” 
317-318). Yet, in keeping with his role as parrhesiast, Debs does believe the party is “the 
only party which honestly represents the working class and the only party that has a 
moral right to appeal to the allegiance and support of the workers and producers of the 
nation” (“The Fight for Freedom” 317). Through these two moves of parrhesia, Debs 
argues that the Socialist party has the sole moral right to represent Americans.  
More importantly, Debs risks his own position by speaking another compulsory 
truth when he encourages his audience to conduct their own research rather than rely on 
his. By drawing attention to the decision making power of the audience, Debs again 
practices parrhesia. It is this self-reflexivity and the encouragement of skepticism that 
defines Debs as parrhesiast and may explain why many cast their votes for a message of 
self-empowerment rather than a belief in the power of exemplary individuals to affect 
change for the masses.  
Importantly, for Debs to be parrhesiast, his frank speaking must involve “risk that 
this truth may disrupt the bond between the speaker and the addressee, usually at peril to 
the speaker” (Gehrke 356). To Debs, these risks involve potentially alienating those 
within his movement who potentially see his leadership as political grandstanding and to 
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those more radical members who see his choice to participate within the democratic 
electoral process as catering to the very system they despise. Aware of these risks, one 
would expect Debs not to highlight these challenges. However, this would violate one of 
the components of parrhesiast: a compulsion for speaking the truth in full knowledge of 
the risks in so doing. As Bradford Vivian writes, “The fearless speaker is a figure, a form, 
of ethical practice: a subject compelled to speak what he or she understands as true 
irrespective of majority opinion—to speak it, in the relevant episteme, without adapting 
words for the sake of hearers, propriety, or situation […] The parrēsia requires the prime 
virtue of courage, not technique” (370). Vivian‟s argument for courage over technique 
further illustrates Debs as parreshiast. 
 True to his compulsion for free speaking, Debs draws immediate skepticism for 
leaders in his speech “This is Our Year.” He argues:  
The workers now realize that they have got to build their organization 
themselves, that it has got to be built from the bottom up, and that it must 
include them all. This knowledge had to come to them through painful and 
costly experience, but they have it and it is of priceless value to them. In 
proportion as they have lost faith in their former „leaders‟ they have 
acquired faith in themselves. (Debs, “This is Our Year” 358)   
In these short introductory statements, Debs‟s words reflect the parrhesiast in two 
essential ways. First, to him, knowledge—or we might say truth—is of the utmost 
importance. After all, it is “of priceless value.” This, of course, is of extreme significance 
to any argument labeling Debs as parrhesiast. Secondly, Debs draws attention to the 
fickle quality of leadership directly. Of course, this implicitly draws attention to his own 
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position as candidate for the presidency and other leaders of the Socialist party. The 
quotation mark around the term “leaders” suggests the possible manner of delivery Debs 
gave to the word.  
With such skepticism surrounding leaders, why should Debs risk distancing 
himself from his audience? The answer involves perhaps his own dissonance with the 
mantel of leader, and, importantly for a discussion of parrhesia, a compulsion that the 
truth, as he understands it, be known even at the expense of his authority. In fact, it is 
from this position as truth teller that Debs derives his authority. However, critics may 
suggest in this instance that Debs deploys a mock humility to feign parrhesia. However, 
by openly inviting suspicion toward leaders, Debs invites the audience to judge his 
sincerity for themselves. In so doing, Debs splits himself as parrhesiast from his role as 
leader and rhetor. Similarly, Gehrke notes, “When speaking as rhetor one would always 
be suspected of bearing no actual parrēsia but only feigned parrēsia, which is not parrēsia 
at all. To speak as parrēsiates would mean that, at least at that moment, one spoke not as 
rhetor or, […] one would have to split the role of rhetor in two: the „run of the mill‟ 
politicians versus the „revered leaders‟ of the city, […]” (358). Debs is the latter as one 
who places himself amongst his party members, recognizing his temporary position as 
leader. Debs announces, “Every true member of the Socialist Party is at the party‟s 
service. The confidence of his comrades is to him a sacred trust and their collective will 
the party‟s law. My chief concern as a presidential candidate is that I shall serve well the 
party, and the class and the cause the party represents” (“Speech of Acceptance” 361). If 
Debs will offer frank criticism of himself to his own constituents, then Debs draws his 
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authority from an ethic that is applicable in all cases and despite all risks, even to himself. 
However, it is from this ethos that Debs draws his rhetorical strength.  
Considering Debs and the element of risk might help us to illustrate an important 
observation of parrhesia that Foucault seems to omit from his lectures. Because parrhesia 
is constituted by an element of risk, which carries with it the possibility of negative 
consequences, one might conclude that parrhesia in any practical sense is a liability. 
Using Debs as an example, one might posit an argument that his inability to triumph in 
the 1912 election was a failure. As a parrhesiast, Debs was at a distinct disadvantage 
because he did not adapt his speeches and moderate his platforms to a general audience 
of American voters, as any savvy politician would. Perhaps, in this respect, parrhesia 
might be a hindrance for political action. However, there is another aspect of Debs‟s 
position in American politics that might not be explained except by his relationship with 
parrhesia: his positive place in collective memory, which is perhaps a different kind of 
victory. 
This victory of posterity might be all the more surprising when considering just 
how far from the political mainstream Debs‟s ideas were in 1912. These ideas were 
provocative enough for Theodore Roosevelt to condemn him and Woodrow Wilson to 
label him a traitor. Others would have surely baulked when looking above Debs‟s desk 
and seeing a picture of Karl Marx (Lee and Andrews 21). Ronald Lee and James R. 
Andrews might best articulate the transformation of Debs from an American deviant to 
hero in collective memory. They argue that four factors impacted the transformation of 
Debs from an American dissident to hero:  
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First, character and ideology interacted to create a favorable portrait of 
Debs. Second, the tradition of American populism at the end of the last 
century provided a framework for reinterpreting Debs‟ radicalism. Third, a 
liberal society‟s commitment to free speech and political protest provided 
a sympathetic climax to the life work of „comrade‟ Debs. Fourth, liberal 
history‟s comic voice provided a narrative frame of reconciliation. (Lee 
and Andrews 22) 
Thus, Debs‟s radicalism becomes transformed “into respectable liberalism” in the 
subsequent years (Lee and Andrews 21). The historical construction of Debs as an 
exemplary American depends on the importance of Debs‟s perceived virtue. This also 
depends, Lee and Andrews believe, on the progressive view of American history.  
Viewing American history as progressive is understandable when considering 
Michael Kammen‟s view of collective or public memory. Kammen argues, “Public 
memory, which contains a slowly shifting configuration of traditions, is ideologically 
important because it shapes a nation‟s ethos and sense of identity. That explains […] why 
memory is always selective and is so often contested” (qtd. in Browne 242). In essence, 
the shifting story of America as a land of the free must contend with the facts of slavery, 
inequality of the sexes, and a variety of injustices inconsistent with modern American 
values. Like the ability to reconcile all of these troubled aspects, Debs and even his 
ideology, which was far from mainstream in 1912, becomes acceptable and even worthy 
of admiration in contemporary America. The extent to which Debs‟s appeal has become 
coalesced into the story of America, Lee and Andrews find, culminates in 1967 when the 
Secretary of the Interior declares that “many of the „radical‟ social reforms Eugene Debs 
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advocated during his five losing campaigns for the Presidency have long since been 
adopted” (qtd. in Lee and Andrews 21). Lee and Andrews are quick to connect this 
ability for Debs to be transformed with his ethos.  
Like Lee and Andrews, James Darsey also explores Debs‟s complex position in 
American collective memory. For Darsey, the reason for Debs‟s continued appeal might 
be explained by this ethos. Darsey argues, “[Debs‟s] passionately held stands and his 
rigidity in holding them exclude him from the ranks of those reasonable, moderate men 
and women who compromise in an effort to find common ground with their opponents 
and are held to represent the ideal in the rhetorical tradition” (“Legend of Eugene Debs” 
434). Despite—or perhaps because of—Debs‟s reluctance to moderate his views in order 
to achieve compromise and avoid risk, he joins a string of rhetors celebrated as coming 
before their time and viewed as models for contemporary figures. Darsey writes, “It is 
because of their failure on behalf of noble principles that they continue to be celebrated 
and to rally those who must carry forward a principle against hopeless odds. They are less 
voices to us than ethical presences. It is in this continuing influence that they have 
achieved their greatest success” (“Legend of Eugene Debs” 435). This rhetoric Darsey 
calls prophetic. However, the power of the rhetoric is not its appropriation from past to 
present, as is the case with all collective memory, but the essence that makes such a 
connection able to be made.  
If Debs‟s rhetoric were not parrhesiastic and therefore courageous, it would not 
have fit into the progressive view of history in which American politics views itself. In 
this way, the risk of parrhesia enables the reward of one‟s discourse being regarded as 
courageous and, thus, appealing. This is not to say Woodrow Wilson does not occupy a 
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favorable position in American collective memory. However, according to Gallup poll, 
he tends to be ranked higher by academics rather than the American public (Saad). 
Perhaps the reason for this decline might be Wilson‟s politics from a contemporary 
perspective might be considered conservative, as would certainly be the case with his 
racial policies.  
 In light of Debs‟s victory in the national collective memory, Foucault‟s 
fascination with the risk and courage inherent in parrhesia is certainly understandable. 
Parrhesia entails certain unavoidable risks. However, without these risks, the parrhesiast 
could not be respected as a courageous orator speaking for the benefit of others. Though 
such a position might hinder a candidate functioning as parrhesiast, the courage of 
frankly speaking can offer a reward reaching beyond the immediate concerns of electoral 
victory. This image of parrhesiast carries with it the consequences and risks of ruin from 
speaking the truth. Eugene Debs certainly understood the risks in speaking out against 
powerful men and institutions during the 1912 elections. Despite ending the election with 
six percent of the popular vote, six years later Debs would have his freedom taken away 
for his devotion to parrhesia by Woodrow Wilson, a powerful enemy made during the 
1912 election.  Thus, Debs‟s commitment to frank speech was not based on political 




AUTHENTICITY, ROOSEVELT, AND THE PARRHESIAST 
PRETENDER 
 Although not made explicit by Foucault, the element of authenticity might be the 
overarching component of parrhesia. Authenticity, to Foucault, relates to the idea that 
what one speaks should be true. By arguing that a speech should be true, Foucault 
suggests that the speech should not necessarily be true in any transcendental sense, 
perhaps not even in an empirically objective sense either. Instead, the truth spoken by a 
parrhesiast should be believed by the speaker to be true. Admittedly, analyzing the 
subjective nature of what another believes to be true is a risky endeavor. Despite this, in a 
way, this is the task that this chapter sets out to accomplish by an analysis of Eugene 
Debs and Theodore Roosevelt.  
 Both Roosevelt and Debs depend on the ethos of authenticity during the 1912 
election. Thus, it seems appropriate to evaluate both by their presentation of authenticity. 
Throughout his campaign speeches, Debs makes a commitment to a presentation of 
parrhesia his chief objective. Importantly, in confronting his fellow candidates, Debs 
makes the central critique of his opponents not their political or economic ideology, but 
their insincerity to the American voters. Thus, the issue for Debs as parrhesiast is that 
Americans deserve honest campaign presentations from their politicians. As dissenters, 
both Roosevelt and Debs are in the unique position to comment on issues and larger 
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American political and economic structures; however, only Debs maintains a sense of 
parrhesia in his speeches for the benefit of the polis. Like Wilson, Debs accused 
Roosevelt of deliberately spreading falsehoods—the ultimate crime against Debs‟s virtue 
of parrhesia. More than any other candidate, Debs presents an image of Roosevelt as an 
opportunist and an ideological thief of Socialist principles. Of his presidential record, 
Debs found the lapses in truth for the sake of ambition the most reprehensible quality of 
the man. This position, of course, makes Roosevelt the opposite of the parreshiast and 
incapable of being trusted. Thus, this chapter will connect the differences between the 
two to the essential principle of authenticity. Through an analysis of Debs‟s and 
Roosevelt‟s speeches, this chapter will argue that Debs was able to perform the role of 
parrhesiast, while Roosevelt was challenged in his ability to convey authenticity rather 
than ambition. 
 Foucault stresses the importance of authenticity from his first explorations of 
parrhesia in his The Hermeneutics of the Subject lectures. Foucault articulates the 
significance of a speaking subject‟s relation to truth as “the subject‟s obligation to tell the 
truth about himself, or this fundamental principle that we must be able to say the truth 
about ourselves in order to be able to establish a relationship to truth in general in which 
we will be able to find our salvation, […]” (Hermeneutics of the Subject 364). It seems 
obvious that the fundamental aspect of parrhesia should be the notion that what a rhetor 
says should be internalized as truth. In this way, parrhesia qua parrhesia must not be 
feigned as a rhetorical tool. Instead, the parrhesiast must be authentic.  
 In this way, parrhesia could almost be considered a calling rather than a 
contrivance. Foucault articulates a similar notion when he says, “parrēsia cannot be 
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inherited as a violent, tyrannical power, and no more is it simply entailed purely by the 
status of the citizen; it must be reserved only for some and cannot be obtained as a matter 
of course” (Government of Self and Others 106). Although the ability for parrhesia is left 
to a few with the fundamental conviction to speak what they regard as a beneficial truth, 
the appearance of parrhesia can easily be feigned, and Foucault was aware of the 
potential for the appearance of parrhesia in those who are not true parrhesiasts. He 
explores this concept in relation to rhetoric, which he argues is the binary to parrhesia. 
Though “rhetoric” may be an unfortunate choice of word, by it Foucault seems to mean 
simply oratorical technique. In opposition to parrhesia, rhetoric or oratory technique, 
“does not entail any bond between the person speaking and what is said, but aims to 
establish a constraining bond, a bond of power between what is said and the person to 
whom it is said” (Foucault, Courage of Truth 14). With so many parrhesiastic pretenders, 
it might seem that finding an authentic parrhesiast is an impossible task. Though 
problematic, the task is achievable.  
Locating a parrhesiast‟s authenticity requires a sustained analysis of that person‟s 
actions over an extended period of time and in spite of significant trial. In this way, the 
ordeal of the parrhesiast is a continued obligation to the truth, as one understands it. 
Foucault argues: 
Not only must this truth really be the personal opinion of the person who 
is speaking but he must say it as being what he thinks, [and not] 
reluctantly—and this is what makes him a parrhesiast. The parrhesiast 
gives his opinion, he says what he thinks, he personally signs, as it were, 
 55 
the truth he states, he binds himself to this truth, and he is consequently 
bound to it and by it (Courage of Truth 11).  
Thus, the parrhesiast is a figure exuding authenticity through continued actions of frank 
speaking. Foucault‟s language in this passage articulates the commitment to parrhesia as 
an overwhelming obligation, an inescapable binding.  
 Certainly, parrhesia entails a radical commitment to authenticity. It outright 
denounces the complete lie as the ultimate crime against truth telling. Even when 
confronted with the operation of telling what might be called half-truths, something 
definitely not uncommon in electoral politics, parrhesia is opposed to any concealment of 
the truth. This is understandable when viewing parrhesia from a Foucauldian perspective, 
where the act of parrhesia is inseparable from the ethics of speaking. In this way, 
parrhesia “consists in telling the truth without concealment, reserve, empty manner of 
speech, or rhetorical ornament which might encode or hide it. „Telling all‟ is then: telling 
the truth without hiding any part of it, without hiding it behind anything” (Foucault, 
Courage of Truth 10). Parrhesia is an all or nothing game. It begins from the internal 
cognitive stage to the external mechanical act of speech. As Foucault asserts, “In short, 
parrhesia, the act of truth requires: first, the manifestation of a fundamental bond 
between the truth spoken and the thought of the person who spoke it; […]” (Courage of 
Truth 11). When the thought is in harmony with the speech, the act can be considered 
parrhesia.  
From this, it is clear that parrhesia is thoroughly subjective, but it also 
symptomatic because its signs can be discerned by close examination of consistent action 
over a prolonged time, simply a speaker‟s seeming continued commitment to 
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authenticity. Foucault says as much when he discusses the Cynic ideal of “being witness 
to the truth” as an example of parrhesia. Foucault summarizes, “Martyr of the truth 
understood as „witness to truth‟: testimony given, manifested, and authenticated by an 
existence, a form of life in the most concrete and material sense of the word; bearing 
witness to the truth by and in one‟s body, dress, mode of comportment, way of acting, 
reacting, and conducting oneself. The very body of the truth is made visible, and 
laughable, in a certain style of life” (Courage of Truth 173). Thus, the parrhesiast can be 
detected by a track record of a manner of living consistent with a commitment to truth, as 
one understands it.  
By this standard, the crucible of a presidential campaign certainly serves an 
appropriate occasion to test the authenticity of Theodore Roosevelt and Eugene Debs. 
From his actions in 1893 as a part of the American Railway Union to his conviction of 
sedition in 1918 for speaking out against World War I, Eugene Debs certainly had a long 
and established record of speaking the truth in the face of considerable risk. However, 
Roosevelt‟s peculiar foray into the presidential election of 1912 casts some questions as 
to his relationship to parrhesia. From his past connections to significant political and 
financial institutions, Debs had reason to be skeptical of Roosevelt. Yet, it is Roosevelt‟s 
presentation of frankness that seemed to be Debs‟s chief concern with the former 
President of the United States. 
 Any analysis of Theodore Roosevelt‟s inconsistency would have to include the 
glaring contradiction that led to his participation in the 1912 election in the first place. At 
the zenith of his political powers in 1904, Roosevelt enthusiastically decreed on election 
night he would not run for a third term for President of the United States. Thus, honoring 
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the example of an informal two-term limit set by George Washington. Because of the 
assassination of President William McKinley, Roosevelt had served nearly two complete 
terms as President. Before a gathering in 1904, Roosevelt definitively announced, “The 
wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the 
form. Under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination” 
(qtd. in Gould 43). His statement could not have been clearer, and he would find “no way 
to undo the strong words he had uttered in November 1904” (Gould 43). However, 
eventually Roosevelt would attempt to do just that.  
 In 1908, Roosevelt steadfastly adhered to his 1904 pledge and supported Taft as 
the successor to his presidency and, as Roosevelt hoped, his Progressive legacy. Though 
he began to see Taft as a traitor to his Progressive agenda, even as late as 1911, Roosevelt 
claimed no intention to enter the campaign (Broderick 40).  However, he gave indications 
of wrestling to reconcile his break with his 1904 promise by telling his friends that should 
he enter the campaign in 1912 it would not be to gain a third consecutive term. Thus, as 
Gould writes of Roosevelt‟s reasoning, “Without the clout of incumbency to dole out 
patronage and sway party conventions, he should not be evaluated in the same light as a 
sitting president trying for a third nomination” (43). At only fifty when he left the 
Presidency, Roosevelt‟s “being needed politics as it needed air; and the need was 
personal, not programmatic” (Broderick 41). Interpreting Taft‟s careful actions as 
president as undoing his predecessor‟s hard-fought reforms, Roosevelt may well have felt 
that his entering the campaign was a duty to the American citizens. This is the approach 
he takes in a letter to a newspaper publisher in 1912. Roosevelt writes: 
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 I have all along felt that even if there should be a strong popular demand 
for me (as to which I can pass no judgment) yet that unless this demand 
were literally overwhelming it could hardly make itself effective. But it 
seems to me that it is better that it should not make itself effective rather 
than that by any action of mine I should make it seem that I desire the 
Presidency for my own sake, or am willing to accept it unless it comes to 
me as the result of a real popular movement, giving expression to a 
demand from at least a substantial portion of the plain people that I should 
undertake a given task in the interest of the people as a whole. Before I 
speak there should be some tangible evidence that such is the case. (qtd. in 
Broderick 42) 
Despite the demands to know empirically whether or not “the plain people” demand him 
to vie for the presidency, Roosevelt, always a man of action, declined to wait passively 
for his summons. Instead, he wrote to governors in Republican states asking for them to 
write to inform him that their citizens were demanding him to run (Broderick 43). From 
this action alone, it seems reasonable to interpret Roosevelt‟s entry into the 1912 election 
and his broken promise in 1904 as being guided by ambition. Likewise, this instance is 
telling of Roosevelt‟s relationship to truth. Unlike a parrhesiast, he seems to view truths 
spoken as mutable and adjustable to the given situation. It is a valuable technique for a 
successful politician, but it runs in contrast to the ethics of a parrhesiast, who must 
display a commitment to authenticity.  
Debs turned his ire toward Theodore Roosevelt once he entered the campaign as 
the fourth large-scale contender for the presidency. Debs argued against Roosevelt‟s 
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sincerity, responding to Roosevelt‟s call that the Progressive “movement is an effort to 
bring the government back to the people. Most men will agree that the people ought to be 
governed but they are not so ready to say that the government should be by the people 
and for the people” (Roosevelt 51). However, Debs points to the logical absurdity of this 
position from the institutionally financed Roosevelt. He argues, “When the owners of the 
trusts finance a party to put themselves out of business; when they turn over their wealth 
to the people from whom they stole it and go to work for a living, it will be time enough 
to consider the merits of the Roosevelt Progressive Party” (Debs, “Speech of 
Acceptance” 364).  
To Debs, Roosevelt‟s vision of a government by the people was drawn from 
Socialist ideology and masked by Roosevelt‟s presentation of himself “as the best agent 
of the middle class to stave off violent societal revolution” (Gould 158). Indeed, in one 
speech Roosevelt positions himself explicitly in such a way when he declares, “I am 
preaching neither anarchy or socialism; I am preaching the curative to socialism and the 
antidote to anarchy. I am preaching and trying to practice the policy of a square deal for 
every man and woman in this republic” (Roosevelt 28). Thus, more than any other 
candidate, Debs presents an image of Roosevelt as an ideological thief of Socialist 
principles to mask Roosevelt‟s real ambitious intentions. This theft Debs‟s campaign saw 
as evident from Roosevelt‟s acceptance speech for the Progressive Party. In a letter to 
Debs, Fred Warren, who attended the Progressive Party Convention, observes:  
I am impressed with the importance of the 3
rd
 party move. There is 
something strikingly significant in the gathering together of 14,000 men 
and women from all part of the nation to declare that they no longer were 
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republicans, thus severing the political ties of a life time. I sat within 
twenty feet of Roosevelt and there were times when I could have shut my 
eyes and readily believed that I was listening to Socialist soap boxer! In 
the decorations, red predominated and the red bandana was very much in 
evidence. (Debs, Letters of Eugene Debs 535) 
Clearly, Warren shows some admiration for Roosevelt‟s ability to mobilize such a large 
crowd at a third party convention. However, Warren foresees the problem of Roosevelt 
appropriating Socialist stances in his campaign discourse. Warren writes further of his 
concerns: “His slogan will be that the nation must elect him in order to save the people 
from Socialism on one hand and predatory wealth on the other. Many of our half baked 
converts will join in the hue and cry that it is better to have half loaf than none at all and 
they will be fooled by his false promises” (Debs, Letters of Eugene Debs 535). Indeed, it 
is understandable why Warren would have been so troubled by Roosevelt at the 
convention. Roosevelt‟s speeches during the election of 1912 do strikingly recall Debs‟s 
rhetoric against the political conglomerates of the Democratic and Republican Parties.  
In thinking about his opponents in the election, Debs‟s speeches present a 
consolidation of Wilson, Taft, and even Roosevelt into a single, monstrous entity, a force 
bent on preserving the institutions and systems of capitalistic oppression that Debs 
despises. The most obvious rhetorical choice would be to position these men as 
representatives of an ideology of oppression, manipulation, and coercion, which to a 
certain extent does factor into the periphery of Debs‟s discourse. Yet, true to the image of 
parrhesiast, Debs makes the chief crime of these men their insincerity. They become the 
opposite of the parrhesiast: liars. They present an ideology of reform and Progressivism, 
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but, as Debs argues, they improperly appropriate concepts of Socialism in order to 
preserve a system fundamentally unsalvageable and incompatible with equality.  
Throughout his 1912 campaign speeches, Debs classifies these men as, at worst, liars 
and, at best, unknowingly ignorant, and, thereby, reinforces his ethos as parrhesiast 
speaking truth to wholly and sincerely reform the American economic and social culture 
for the benefit of its people.  
Despite some of his opponents‟ remarks to the contrary, Debs realized the 1912 
election was only operating within the boundaries of a preservation of American 
capitalist ideology (Flehinger 56). Therefore, part of his message of education was to 
unmask the four choices of candidates were really only a choice between Socialism and 
Capitalism. Yet, all of these opponents to socialist ideology were not equal in terms of 
their appeal to voters. Their difference, according to Debs, was not so much ideological. 
If that were the case, Debs‟s should have focused his criticism intensely on Taft, as he 
was the most conservative of the three other candidates. The difference was in terms of 
the presentation of truth. Thus, for Debs the inauthentic candidate was his principle 
adversary.  
 In one of his early speeches, Roosevelt mirrors Debs‟s assemblage of both 
Democrat and Republican corruption. Roosevelt declares, “The success of the 
Democratic National ticket means enthroning in power one set of bosses; the success of 
the Republican National ticket means enthroning in power the other set of bosses. […] In 
their essence the Democratic and the Republican machines are alike. Both are controlled 
by the like powerful beneficiaries of privilege: privileged political and privileged 
 62 
financial” (12). This is essentially the same association Debs makes to link the three 
parties when he announces: 
The infallible test of a political party is the private ownership of the 
sources of wealth and the means of life. Apply that test to the Republican, 
Democratic and Progressive parties and upon that basic, fundamental issue 
you will find them essentially one and the same. They differ according to 
the conflicting interests of the privileged classes, but at the bottom they 
are alike and stand for capitalist class rule and working class slavery. 
(“Speech of Acceptance” 363) 
Both Roosevelt and Debs are arguing against the corruptive party bureaucracy of both 
major parties, and both argue against the concentration of the wealth through rules and 
regulations in the hands of a privileged few. Both men present an argument that a vote for 
either major party is in reality not a choice for different policies but merely of 
figureheads. This might not be so surprising for American third party candidates, whose 
formation is generally the result of dissatisfaction with both parties to represent their 
ideology. In their struggle to coordinate a national campaign, these candidates would 
naturally resent the financial and organizational resources of thoroughly established 
political institutions.  
However, what makes the situation odd in the case of Roosevelt is that he was a 
part and indeed the undisputed leader of the party that he now condemns for their 
ingrained boss politics. Indeed, only a few months earlier, Roosevelt rigorously struggled 
to once again represent the Republicans on the national electoral stage. This begs the 
question of what prompted Roosevelt‟s sudden shift. Was it simply that he shifted 
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alliances in an act of political expediency, or did Roosevelt truly believe the party had 
become corrupted? This is perhaps the central question for Roosevelt in regards to 
parrhesia. He gives somewhat of an explanation of his reason in a speech at the Boston 
Common. Roosevelt declares, “[B]ecause you are honest, I try to be honest, yes. Because 
it‟s your fight. Now as I said in the primaries last year I said, „Now if the people beat me 
it is all right, I have nothing to say, but if the people are for me and the politicians beat 
me out of victory I‟ll have a good deal to say.‟ […] And I am saying it now. I‟m saying it 
now” (19). From this speech, Roosevelt seems to suggest that he only discovered the 
corrupting forces in the Republican Party, which he calls “the politicians,” when they 
prevented him from attaining the nomination and prevented “the people” from rightfully 
choosing their nominee.  
Whatever Roosevelt‟s actual motivation might have been, Debs was quick to react 
to what he perceived as Roosevelt‟s theft of Socialist ideals. Flehinger writes, 
“Recognizing the similarity between Roosevelt‟s ideas and Socialism, Debs accused 
Roosevelt of stealing and perverting the Socialists‟ ideas, […]” (55). Yet, most upsetting 
to Debs was the belief that this improper appropriation of Socialist ideas would result in 
Roosevelt‟s “phony promises” (Broderick 174). Gould writes, “Debs attempted to fight 
back in the mainstream press with letters that pointed out what he believed Roosevelt was 
doing to steal ideas for the Socialists and how he was deceiving the electorate about his 
true role. […] Debs denounced Roosevelt‟s new party as a sham and urged his audiences 
to support the real source of potential change, the Socialists” (158). Thus, Debs again 
functioned as parrhesiast to reveal what he regarded as the truth of Roosevelt‟s 
Progressive party.  
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 In his speech “The Fight for Freedom,” Debs charges Roosevelt as being the great 
deceiver of the American people. Like Taft and Wilson, Debs accuses Roosevelt of being 
financed by capitalist entities. He argues that the logical conclusion of this association is 
that Roosevelt cannot represent the common citizen. Debs asks, “Is the man not foolish, 
to the verge of being feeble-minded, who imagines that great trust magnates, […] are 
flooding the country with Roosevelt money because he is the champion of progressive 
principle and the find of the common people?” (“The Fight for Freedom” 305-306). In 
speaking out against Roosevelt and his financers, Debs risks making powerful enemies, 
as every act of parrhesia requires the incursion of some risk.  
Yet, Debs‟s ethos as compulsive parrhesiast requires him to engage in frank 
speaking. Rather than an innovative new political party, Debs argues, “The new 
Progressive Party is a party of progressive capitalism. It is lavishly financed and shrewdly 
advertised. But it stands for capitalism all the same” (“Speech of Acceptance” 363). 
Thus, Debs argues the strength of the party is not its ideology but its surface appearance 
of actual change reinforced through Roosevelt‟s celebrity and generous institutional 
financial backing.  
 It was a distinct advantage and disadvantage that Roosevelt did have a record as 
president, which both Wilson and Debs used to critique various contradictions and 
failings. Of his presidential record, Debs believed that Roosevelt‟s inconsistencies could 
be explained by his ambition. Debs‟s critique in 1912 is not the first time he noted lapses 
in Roosevelt‟s record. Indeed, in an article penned by Debs for the Socialist newspaper 
Appeal to Reason in 1907, he writes of Roosevelt‟s shifting position toward organized 
labor. Debs writes: 
 65 
The letter of President Roosevelt to the Moyer and Haywood conference 
of New York is in strange contrast with the one previously addressed by 
him to the Chicago conference on the same subject. The two letters are so 
entirely dissimilar in spirit and temper that they seem to have been written 
by different persons. In the first the President bristles with defiance, in the 
last he is the pink of politeness. […] Again has the President vindicated 
his reputation as one of the smoothest of politicians and one of the most 
artful and designing of demagogues. (“Roosevelt‟s Labor Letters” 247) 
Aware of the accusations of his totalizing political ambitions, Roosevelt, in his famous 
speech after an assassination attempt, asserts his ethical veracity and the seriousness of 
his devotion to the Progressive Party. Roosevelt argues, “Friends, I ask you now this 
evening to accept what I am saying as absolutely true, when I tell you I am not thinking 
of my own success. I am not thinking of my life or of anything connected with me 
personally” (175).  However, Roosevelt‟s speech makes a turn from a concern with 
truthfulness and modesty to a somewhat unsettling display. Roosevelt continues:  
I am thinking of the movement, I say this by way of introduction, because 
I want to say something very serious to our people and especially to the 
newspapers. I don‟t know anything about who the man was who shot me 
to-night. He was seized once by one of the stenographers in my party, Mr. 
Martin, and I suppose is now in the hands of the police. He shot to kill. He 
shot—the shot, the bullet went in here—I will show you. (175-6) 
Perhaps Roosevelt might be excused for being unsettled by the attempt on his life. 
However, he characterizes his pleas for belief as a mere introduction to what becomes a 
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display of virility, which takes away from his message. Instead, Roosevelt has seized on 
the assassination attempt as a means of sensationalism for the newspapers. After all, his 
speech indicates that he is speaking “especially to the newspapers.”  
If Roosevelt might be excused for using the assassination attempt to his own 
political advantage, his seizing the opportunity for unsubstantiated conjecture and slander 
to others is certainly ethically problematic. Tellingly, Roosevelt uses the situation to 
attack his opponents, who he argues might be the cause of the attempted assassination. 
Roosevelt declares, “Now, friends, of course, I do not know, as I say, anything about 
him; but it is a very natural thing that weak and vicious minds should be inflamed to acts 
of violence by the kind of awful mendacity and abuse that have been heaped upon me for 
the last three months by the papers of not only Mr. Debs but of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Taft” 
(177). Here, it‟s obvious that Roosevelt is attempting to use this incident to its fullest 
potential by lobbying accusations of conspiracy at his three opponents and leveraging the 
political capital of the moment. This insatiable desire for showmanship does make one 
conscious of Roosevelt‟s ability to seize the moment for effect, but his zeal for 
performance for the newspapers seems to betray a desire for ambition rather than to speak 
truth for the benefit of the American people. If Roosevelt were to blame any politician for 
the attempt on his life, it might have oddly enough been President William McKinley, 
who happened to have been eleven years dead in 1912. As the man who shot Roosevelt, 
John Schrank, explained his reason for targeting Roosevelt was “the ghost of William 
McKinley had instructed him to kill the Progressive candidate lest there be a third term” 
(Gould 171). Clearly, Roosevelt‟s accusations of his opponents were unfounded, but they 
did demonstrate his cunning opportunism.  
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It might be escapades like these that led Debs to point to Roosevelt‟s pleas for 
others to believe his truthfulness as the ultimate insincerity from an inauthentic man. 
Debs argues, “The truth is that if the Bull Moose candidate dared to permit an itemized 
publication of his campaign contributions in his present mad and disgraceful pursuit of 
the presidency, […] it would paralyze him and scandalize the nation” (“The Fight for 
Freedom” 306). Thus, because of his affiliation with the capitalist institutions that fund 
his campaign, Roosevelt cannot be expected to truly represent the working American 
citizenry. Importantly for a discussion of parrhesia, Debs argues Roosevelt should be 
judged on his record as president and “not upon his empty promises as a ranting 
demagogue and vote-seeking politician” (“The Fight for Freedom” 306). Because 
Roosevelt‟s motivation is based on political opportunism, Debs argues he cannot be 
trusted in any of his promises. This position, of course, makes Roosevelt the opposite of 
the parrhesiast and incapable of trust.  
On one occasion, Roosevelt did address the similarities between his Progressive 
Party and the Socialist Party. Roosevelt argues: 
You ask about the Socialists. Of course that is a question altogether too 
big to answer at this time. What I can say is this: in our platform we have 
grappled with certain of the evils with which the Socialists haven striven 
to grasp. The difference that we are grappling with those evils in a 
practical way that will cure them, and the Socialists are chasing will-o‟-the 
wisps. That is the difference. That is the first difference between us and 
them. (28) 
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This remark is particularly cordial in that Roosevelt respectfully articulates the difference 
between the two movements is that one is pragmatic and the other is not.  
Despite their differences, the Socialists, Roosevelt concedes, are somewhat 
marching toward the same goal and fighting against some of the same “evils.” Yet, 
Roosevelt was not always so cordial to Debs and Socialism, as Debs documents in his 
1907 article. Debs writes, “Has the President ever heard of one Theodore Roosevelt? […] 
And one Theodore Roosevelt who in the same year of 1896 said that Altgeld and one 
Debs should be lined up against a dead wall and shot? Which said Roosevelt never 
denied until four years later, when he became candidate for Vice President?” 
(“Roosevelt‟s Labor Letters 250). Debs is referring to an incident when John P. Altgeld, 
the governor of Illinois, questioned the authority of the federal government to send troops 
into Illinois to stop the Pullman strike.  
However, Debs and others no doubt would have marveled at Roosevelt‟s stance 
toward organized labor in the 1912 election. Before one crowd in Michigan, Roosevelt 
announces, “As Mr. Wilson has seen fit to attack the Progressive platform about labor, 
and especially about organized labor, I ask you to compare what I urged on Congress and 
what I succeeded in getting Congress to do, during the time I was President […] Most of 
what I advocated then is now embodied as a demand in the social and industrial justice 
plank of the Progressive platform” (153). Either Roosevelt had moderated his disdain for 
Debs by 1912 or he saw the need as a third party candidate to align himself somewhat 
with Socialists in a hope, as Warren feared, to convert them to the Progressive Party by 
the deadline of the November election.  
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As a punishment for an ultimate crime against truth, Debs argues for Roosevelt‟s 
absolute condemnation. He declares, “For the very reason that the trusts are pouring out 
their millions to literally buy his nomination and election and force him into the White 
House for a third term, and if possible for life, the people should rise in their might and 
repudiate him as they never have repudiated a recreant official who betrayed their trust” 
(Debs, “The Fight for Freedom” 307). To a man who places an ethical obligation to speak 
the truth for the benefit of all, the ephemeral commitment to truth is unacceptable. Thus, 
the compulsion to speak against these candidates for their insincerity reinforces the image 
of Debs as parrhesiast and may account for his popularity during the 1912 election.  
Debs successfully avoided accusations of ambition by projecting an authentic 
ethos to unite his party behind him and to appeal to voters beyond the Socialist party by 
rhetorically shifting the power to the audience. It is this usage of parrhesia that surely 
must have been a factor in making his 1912 leadership position more palatable to those 
within his party who united behind him despite some misgivings regarding traditional 
politics and an inherent skepticism of leadership in general. More importantly to 
understanding how Debs drew such a large percentage of the popular vote in 1912 is 
Debs‟s evocation of parrhesia and truth telling as the mission of his candidacy throughout 
the campaign. Importantly, his mission is not to change things himself. His mission via 
telling the truth is to awaken others to change things for themselves. The political power 
rests not within Debs, but with the people he is seeking to explain the truth to. Thus, his 
mission is essentially one of education. In this way, Debs argues, “We do not plead for 
votes; the workers give them freely the hour they understand” (“Speech of Acceptance” 
362). This strategy of declaring that power rests with the people themselves to effect 
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change rather than with an exemplary figure may have softened Debs‟s position to 
American voters wary of a Socialist candidate. After all, there was nothing to fear from 
Debs because, as he reiterated, they were the ones with power.  
In this way, Debs positions himself as educator. As educator, Debs must inform 
others to realize their situation. He argues, “But we need to destroy the prejudice that still 
exists and dispel the darkness that still prevails in the working class world. We need the 
clear light of sound education and conquering power of economic and political 
organization” (Debs, “Speech of Acceptance” 363). As rhetor and educator, he does not 
call for a reanalysis of the situation through a new ideological lens. Rather, his is a call to 
notice the conditions that are already present. To American voters, this call for education 
on issues and positions surely must have seemed like a small request to make. It is 
important to distinguish between Socialist ideology and its connection to truth, for if 
Debs were to speak in order to move citizens from the Democratic, Republican, or 
Progressive platform to Socialism, he would be acting only as politician and not 
parreshiast; however, Debs insists his audience not blindly embrace Socialism because of 
political favor but because Socialism, properly understood, advocates truth.  
This aligns with Foucault‟s perspective on the mission of the parrhesiast. Foucault 
argues in The Hermeneutics of the Subject: “The objective of parrhēsia is to act so that at 
a given moment the person to whom one is speaking finds himself in a situation in which 
he no longer needs the other‟s discourse” (379). It‟s important to note the transitory 
nature of the parrhesiast. The parrhesiast is not merely speaking only for the sake of 
speaking. Instead, the parrhesiast has a purpose. He or she hopes that the parrhesia 
spoken will result in some action to the person or group spoken to. As Foucault 
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articulates, the goal is to change the situation so that this particular act of parrhesia is no 
longer needed. In Debs‟s case, his act is to speak “the truth in order to direct the city, in a 
position of superiority in which one is perpetually jousting with others” (Government of 
Self 157). This truth telling act of parrhesia provides the perspective citizens should have 
in order to make an informed act: the vote for President of the United States. 
 In comparison to Debs in 1912, an analysis of Roosevelt contributes to an 
exploration of parrhesia with the question: What is the relationship between truth and 
change over a given time? If authenticity, defined as consistency, is a condition for 
parrhesia, this presents problems for the natural state of one‟s perspective shifting over a 
given time depending on a particular issue. If this is the means of determining 
authenticity, is there an acceptable time frame in which one‟s stance can change and the 
speaking of this altered view could be considered parrhesia? As this chapter has shown, 
Roosevelt‟s statements not only contradict each from 1904 to 1912, but from one month 
in 1912 to the next. To be fair, Debs own positions also changed during the course of his 
life, as would be expected. He served as a loyal Democrat in 1884 but later discovered 
Socialism and recanted his belief in the Democratic Party. My point is not that one must 
steadfastly hold to something once spoken throughout an entire life. Indeed, were 
rigorous adherence to a position for the sole reason to avoid contradiction the only 
consideration for defining a parrhesiast, such a position would clearly not be an ideal 
model for any politician or rhetor to emulate. However, in stressing a parrhesiast‟s 
commitment to telling all, Foucault‟s writings suggest parrhesia as an ethical framework 
more than a prescriptive philosophy.  
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 This being the case, parrhesia does involve a bond between the speaker and the 
audience. This is what Foucault refers to as the parrhesiastic game. Foucault argues, 
“This kind of pact, between the person who takes the risk of telling the truth and the 
person who agrees to listen to it, is at the heart of what could be called the parrhesiastic 
game” (Courage of Truth 13). Because of this connection, it might be expected that the 
speaker should feel this obligation extending to a desire to explain oneself and, therefore, 
respect the relationship between the two.  
For some, as was the case with Debs, this explanation might take the form of a 
conversion narrative. For others, as was the case with Roosevelt, an explanation might 
come in the form of rationalizing one‟s previous statement so as to avoid contradiction. 
However, this latter approach implies superiority over one‟s audience. By rationalizing 
away a previous contradictory statement, the speaker is suggesting an audience did not 
understand the meaning of what was spoken. This approach can appear disingenuous, 
especially in politics. Once such a descriptor as “disingenuous” is applied, the entire 
ethos is questionable and the power of one‟s parrhesia is severely tainted. Parrhesia then 
can serve as a guide for appropriate political conduct to avoid these negative 
consequences. Foucault identifies parrhesia‟s role as “what ensures the appropriate game 
of politics” (Government of Self 159). This is the lesson of parrhesia that becomes 
apparent in the case of Theodore Roosevelt. Whatever his actual motivations were in the 
1912 election, his many inconsistencies leave him vulnerable to attacks not only from 
Debs but from Taft and Wilson. Arguably, his questionable authenticity may have led to 
his defeat due to his inability to gain the Republican nomination, thus splitting the 
Republican electorate between Taft and Roosevelt.  
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Whether it was ambition that guided Roosevelt, an analysis of his actions over 
time suggests an ethic and a relationship to truth as one understands it that is not 
consistent with that of a parrhesiast. A comparison of Roosevelt and Debs only further 
highlights Debs‟s consistent presentation of authenticity throughout the 1912 campaign. 
The presentation of authenticity is paramount because parrhesia does not necessarily 
imply some metaphysical access to transcendental truth; it is a much more local and 
subjective concern. It involves the speaking of truth as one understands it for the benefit 
of another. Though determining authenticity is admittedly fraught with problems, it is 
best attempted by the analysis of one‟s actions over time. If one‟s actions do not 
demonstrate a consistency in presenting truth, then this person is not a parrhesiast, but 





 There never was a President Eugene V. Debs. When the final votes were counted 
Wilson captured only forty-one percent of the vote, and Debs received 901,551 votes, 
equaling six percent of the popular vote. However, Debs‟s inability to seize the 
presidency need not be viewed as a failure. Indeed, as a third party Socialist candidate for 
president, Debs‟s achievement of six percent is a victory worthy of study. As I have 
argued, Debs‟s 1912 campaign and the result might be best explained by his positioning 
himself as a parrhesiast, who speaks truth for the benefit of the citizenry. This perspective 
is apparent when considering the ways in which parrhesia‟s three essential elements of 
compulsion, risk, and authenticity manifest in Debs‟s campaign discourse.  
 Any inquiry into Debs‟s political campaigns centers around how to situate and 
define his victory. To scholars like Francis Broderick, victory is the attainment of the 
presidency immediately or in long-term. However, by Debs‟s own standard, his victory is 
no less ambitious, but it is certainly of a different orientation. In many of his speeches, 
Debs is self-deflating of himself and other candidates, thereby granting agency to his 
audience rather than to any politician. This suggests the sensibility of the parrhesiast. 
Debs, as parrhesiast, speaks because of a motivation to deliver a message for the benefit 
of those listening.  
Some scholars, such as Broderick, view Debs‟s campaign as more of an anomaly 
rather than a significant gain for Debs‟s particular campaign approach. Broderick writes, 
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“Debs, having doubled the Socialist vote in four years, appeared to be a winner, but 
within months after the election, gross internal strains in the party revealed that 1912 was 
a climax rather than a milestone for the Socialists” (211). For Broderick, the result of 
Debs‟s campaign seems to be related to how far he could move the spectrum of the 
Socialist party into institutional politics, and the goal might be the establishment of the 
Socialist party as a serious contender in the next bout with the traditional two parties. 
However, recreating the Socialist party in the image of the Democratic and Republican 
organization was never Debs‟s goal in 1912, as he repeatedly made clear in numerous 
declarations. Perhaps the most concise of them being Debs‟s remark, “The Socialist Party 
is fundamentally different from all other parties. It came in the process of evolution and 
grows with the growth of the forces which created it. Its spirit is militant and its aim 
revolutionary” (“Speech of Acceptance” 361). Clearly, Debs viewed the Socialist party‟s 
mission as one with an inherently radical agenda, one that stands irreconcilable with the 
sensibilities of the Democratic and Republican parties. Thus, Broderick‟s evaluation of 
Debs seems inappropriate for the type of politics in which Debs was engaged.  
Unlike Broderick, Lewis L. Gould does not so narrowly define victory for Debs 
as the attainment of the mantle of President of the United States. Overall, Gould views 
1912 as a disappointment for Debs and his party stalwarts. To Gould, victory seems to be 
defined in terms of total percentage of votes cast. Gould writes, “The bigger percentage 
gains for Debs and his party came in the West in states such as Oklahoma, Montana, 
Arizona, and Washington. Perhaps the Socialists would have done better by 
concentrating their efforts in the states where there were more potential voters” (180). To 
Gould, Debs would have made more of an impression had he went about his campaign 
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with less zeal and more strategy. Thus, the travels around the entire country were, to 
Gould, ultimately a waste of time and energy, an evaluation Debs would have thoroughly 
protested, which Gould acknowledges when he writes,  “In any case, Debs was going to 
campaign nationwide no matter what” (180). Gould seems to suggest that Debs‟s 
advocating for a national campaign had more to do with his pining for celebrity and 
misplaced belief in the great awakening of class-consciousness.  
However, Gould‟s assertion is directly contrasted in Debs‟s own self-deflating 
campaign speeches, which invite his audience to question not only the leadership status 
of Taft, Wilson, and Roosevelt but Debs‟s own position. Debs‟s rationale for conducting 
a truly national campaign rather than strategic regional efforts might not make political 
sense to Gould, but this approach aligns with Debs‟s argument that his campaign is as 
much about education and awareness as any political victory. As I have argued 
throughout the preceding chapters, the 1912 campaign provided the perfect opportunity 
for Debs to bring his educational messages to the masses, and in so doing his approach is 
parrhesiastic. With this expressed goal, it is, therefore, logical for Debs to conduct his 
campaign in as broad an orientation as possible. The ways in which Debs viewed his 
campaign‟s mission and Gould and Broderick evaluate this campaign could not be more 
dissimilar in their orientation. To Gould, victory plainly comes down to the numbers. He 
makes this point clear when he argues, “[1912] was the highest percentage of the popular 
vote that the Socialist Party ever achieved. But they could have done better. Gene Debs 
was wrong. It was not their year after all” (Gould 180). However, victory can be defined 
beyond numerical results. 
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 If a campaign‟s effectiveness is best evaluated by its utility for subsequent 
campaigns, then Debs‟s parrhesiastic campaign technique did prove successful. Although 
Debs did not run for president in 1916, he did run again for president once more in 1920, 
while he was serving a sentence in federal prison for sedition (Gould 185). For obvious 
reasons, Debs was unable to engage in the grueling campaign schedule he maintained in 
1912, which makes the fact that he earned 919,000 votes from a prison cell all the more 
illustrative of his ethical appeal. Though his risk in speaking out might be less than in 
1912, after all he was already imprisoned in 1920, overcoming the stigma of a convict‟s 
black-and-white garb could not be achieved without the significant ethos Debs had 
earned from a proven track record of authenticity. Certainly, this result can in part be 
attributed to the political capital he garnered in 1912 as well as the cultural capital from 
his famous sedition trial, another example of Debs‟s parrhesiastic sensibility. Perhaps one 
of the key indicators of Debs‟s influence was President Warren Harding officially 
pardoning him in 1921, just three years after his conviction by Wilson.  
 American history has demonstrated the transitory influence of a sitting president 
to direct beneficial and lasting policies. Though winning the presidency does provide 
temporary authority and entitlement, it does not guarantee the ability to institute positive 
changes for the citizenry. This presents another type of victory: a victory evaluated in 
terms of policy impact. When framed in this way, Debs can certainly be considered 
victorious. As even Broderick concedes, the reforms that seemed unattainable in 1912 
eventually become accepted. Broderick writes, “At the other end, the Socialist platform, 
rather more than Eugene V. Debs himself, had proposed a panoply of reforms deemed 
radical at the time, many of which are now the law of the land” (218). Though Broderick 
 78 
seems to diminish Debs‟s involvement, Debs occupies an interesting space in public 
memory, as I have argued in chapter two, and he is forever linked with the reforms 
proposed in 1912. By making these reforms palatable to a wider public, the victory, at 
least in part, can rightly be attributed to Debs‟s adept parrhesiastic discourse.  
Yet for Debs, parrhesia is not a tool to be dispensed in order to gain votes, but this 
does not mean that parrhesia did not help him do just that. Indeed, parrhesia in relation to 
Debs illustrates its continuing potentiality in politics. However, in considering parrhesia‟s 
application in campaign politics, the post-mortem of Debs‟s campaign requires the 
resolution of two overarching and unresolved questions concerning parrhesia: Is parrhesia 
even compatible with politics, and, if so, how can parrhesia work in politics? 
 Foucault considers these types of questions over the course of The Government of 
Self and Others and The Courage of Truth lectures. For Foucault, the answer is an 
affirmation. Indeed, in The Government of Self and Others, Foucault offers one definition 
of parrhesia that articulates parrhesia as inseparable from politics. In one instance, 
Foucault argues, “[P]arrēsia, the truth-telling of the political man, is what ensures the 
appropriate game of politics” (Government of Self 159). The proper game of politics, 
according to Foucault, centers on the absolute presentation of truth from the politician. In 
this idealistic sense, political sparring involves one politician‟s parrhesia weighted 
against another‟s. Foucault explains, “Parrēsia consists in making use of logos in the 
polis— logos in the sense of true, reasonable discourse, discourse which persuades, and 
discourse which may confront other discourse and will triumph only through the weight 
of its truth and the effectiveness of its persuasion […]”(Government of Self 105). This 
view of parrhesia might seem like an idealized view of political operation, a variation of 
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“the truth will out” adage, yet, he states, “the notion of parrhēsia was first of all and 
fundamentally a political notion” (Foucault, Courage of Truth 8). It is only with Socrates, 
Foucault explains, that the life of a parrhesiast and politician become irreconcilable. 
However, perhaps unknowingly, Socrates proves they can both be joined together. 
 Foucault interprets Socrates‟s decision to not enter traditional politics as a signal 
of the two concepts‟ irreconcilability. What prevents Socrates from a political life is the 
“daemonic voice” that only prevents certain actions but does not prescribe appropriate 
actions, which is the task of the politician (Foucault, Courage of Truth 77). From this, 
Foucault extrapolates, “The apparent explanation is the bad functioning of democratic 
parrhēsia, or of political parrhēsia more generally; it is the impossibility of performing 
the parrhesiastic role properly, fully, and thoroughly when one is dealing with political 
institutions” (Courage of Truth 77).  However, as Foucault notes, Socrates refutes this 
impossibility with his example of serving as epistates, the equivalent of president, during 
the trial of the eight Athenian generals after the Battle of Arginusae, where he boldly 
attempted to prevent a vote for their execution. Socrates‟s example presents the “possible 
figure of the parrhesiast politician who agrees to take the floor, regardless of dangers and 
threats, because it is in the city‟s interest. And, possibly risking death, he speaks the 
truth” (Foucault, Courage of Truth 76). Tellingly, when considering the three essential 
qualities of a parrhesiast—compulsion, risk, and authenticity—all are present and none 
are diluted by Socrates‟s political participation as epistates.  After all, Socrates clearly 
felt some compulsion to speak out despite the opinion of other assemblymen, he took 
great risk in positioning himself on a sensitive issue, and he demonstrated authenticity by 
his consistent presentation of his actions as being in the service of his duty. Thus, 
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although Socrates might have attempted to separate politics from philosophy, which he 
believed offered the proper forum for parrhesia, his actions demonstrate how politics and 
parrhesia can coexist.  
 In a more modern context, Eugene Debs also demonstrates how parrhesia can 
function in the American politics. Although Debs is an atypical politician because of his 
consistent practice of parrhesia in electoral politics, he, nevertheless, proves there is a 
space in politics for a practicing parrhesiast. Importantly for an application in 
contemporary politics, Debs‟s actions demonstrate not only that such a marriage between 
these two concepts is possible, but that it can be effective in garnering votes and 
productive in terms of attaining overall political and cultural influence through one‟s 
ethos. As I have suggested throughout this thesis, his example provides a few principles 
that offer a possibility for effectively entwining the practice of truth telling with politics. 
These principles can best be expressed in terms of the three essential elements of 
parrhesia: compulsion, risk, and authenticity.  
 As discussed in chapters two and four, primary races for the major political 
parties can be an exhausting endeavor, leaving some politicians depleted even before the 
general election begins. What was true in 1912 is no less applicable in contemporary 
politics. The motivation and perseverance needed to sustain oneself through this onerous 
process requires a sense of compulsion, which is one of the principle qualities of 
parrhesia. Debs demonstrated his compulsive motivation to speak out to numerous 
audiences in various locations across the United States despite fragile health. Debs 
certainly seems to have been compelled to endure such trials. Perhaps this is where 
parrhesia provides a competitive advantage to a practicing candidate in that it requires 
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compulsive devotion to oneself and to others, as I discuss in chapter two an 
internal/external commitment. Candidates may find the drive from primary candidacy to 
Election Day from a variety of sources: duress, egotism, or vengeance. Unlike these other 
sources, parrhesia seems to translate well into campaign messaging. It is somewhat 
obvious to assume that voters would find messaging related to a candidate‟s sense of 
service appealing when voting for public servant. For a parrhesiast, such a stance is 
natural. 
Because parrhesia involves a continuous compulsion to speak frankly, a 
parrhesiast‟s mission is never complete. There is always a new rhetorical situation in 
which to offer parrhesia. This attribute proves especially beneficial to a politician. After 
all, the ebbs and flows of victory and defeat define the life of a politician, and recovery 
from a defeat, particularly an electoral defeat, is critical. The parrhesiast is suited to 
recovery because the compulsive motivation of parrhesia spurs one forward to the next 
forum. Debs is the perfect example of this sensibility. From failed strikes to failed 
elections to imprisonment, Debs had his share of defeat. Despite these setbacks, he 
always persevered and treated each campaign as an opportunity. Because of this 
perseverance, Debs found ways to remain culturally and politically relevant and even 
influential.  
In any field, risk is not a concept normally viewed as an advantage; it is, rather, an 
element that should be minimized if at all possible. Yet, risk is essential to parrhesia, as 
chapter three illustrates, and counterintuitively, risk can hold a long-term advantage even 
in politics. As the example of Debs illustrates, his influence extended far beyond the 
particular historical moment of the 1912 election due to his positive remembrance in 
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public memory. Because Americans tend to view history through a lens of progressivism, 
as rhetorical scholars have commented, in speaking frankly in 1912, Debs‟s parrhesia 
resonated deeply in the years following the election even if the majority of Americans 
might not have been willing to accept his policy proposals at the moment his actual 
discourse took place.  
Again, the risk of parrhesia affords Debs a different kind of victory, as many of 
his policy proposals were later adopted and his status radically changed from outlier to a 
celebrated citizen representing the American ideal of free speech. Without accepting the 
risks of parrhesia, this transformation would likely not have occurred. Democracy is 
based on a compromise, but it is also based on assembling the opinions and perspectives 
of a diverse set of participants. Parrhesia helps these opinions to be shared, and, to be 
sure, there is risk involved in doing so. Debs may not have won the election, but he 
influenced it and his influence certainly extends beyond a singular election. The practice 
of parrhesia may not result in immediate victory, but victory does not require one to win 
a leadership position in order to be effective. The lesson of parrhesiastic risk, which Debs 
embraced, is that it may not award short-term goals, but it can result in respect from one‟s 
opponents, as was the case for Debs, and the potential for long-term achievement of what 
might initially appear to be unachievable objectives, as is also the case for Debs. 
Effectively, the truism “nothing ventured, nothing gained” might most succinctly express 
the potential of parrhesia, but to concretize this aphorism, the historical victory of Debs 
best demonstrates the potential benefit of parrhesia‟s risks.  
The final aspect of parrhesia that holds potential in politics is authenticity. By its 
very nature politics is tied to intense public scrutiny. This was the case in the1912 
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election and remains the case in contemporary politics. However, unlike 1912, 
technological advances have only further pushed the political arena into the public‟s 
gaze. From C-SPAN to YouTube, the voting public has unprecedented access to the inner 
lives of politicians and the ability to crowd source the fact checking of every public or 
private statement. Thus, it is even more critical in contemporary politics to display an 
authentic ethos and maintain a public and private consistency from one‟s speeches to a 
general public to private small-group conservations, a lesson Mitt Romney, for example, 
would have done well to remember in the 2012 election.  
The result of misalignment is significantly consequential. In the parlance of the 
day, an inconsistent politician is reduced to a mere “flip-flopper,” diminishing the quality 
of a candidate from a contender to a clog. Here, the parrhesiast politician has a distinct 
advantage in that parrhesia demands authenticity. Through a compulsive motivation for 
speaking frankly, a politician offering parrhesia should demonstrate consistent sincerity 
over time. Inconsistency between the public and private beliefs of a candidate should not 
exist in a parrhesiast politician. Because no matter the occasion, the practice of parrhesia 
is an ethical act requiring sincerity, consistency, and the courage to steadfastly maintain 
and defend one‟s beliefs. In practice, this is surely idealistic, difficult, and demanding; 
yet, Eugene Debs demonstrated it is possible even within the field of American politics.  
Ultimately, the example of Eugene Debs helps to codify some of the aspects of 
parrhesia that Michel Foucault‟s unfinished project leaves to Antiquity. Over its many 
instantiations, the concept of parrhesia endures, though perhaps it may not be recognized 
as such. Though the label of parrhesiast might not have been previously applied to 
Eugene Debs, the sensibilities and qualities of a parrhesiast were certainly present in him 
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and their traces remain in his surviving rhetoric. As a politician practicing parrhesia, 
Debs can serve as an example of how parrhesia functions in American electoral politics 
and how it might effectively continue. At one point in The Courage of Truth lectures, 
Foucault ponders whether the parrhesiastic mode has disappeared from practice in 
modern society. I believe it was certainly present in 1912 in the candidacy of Eugene 
Debs, but work remains to be done to locate parrhesia in a more contemporary context. 
The potential is certainly there. Hopefully, further studies will reveal parrhesia is a 
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